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ABSTRACT
This paper has two goals. First, we discuss several emerging approaches to applied welfare analysis
under non-standard ("behavioral") assumptions concerning consumer choice.  This provides a
foundation for Behavioral Public Economics. Second, we illustrate applications of these approaches
by surveying behavioral studies of policy problems involving saving, addiction, and public goods.
We argue that the literature on behavioral public economics, though in its infancy, has already
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1. Introduction 
 
  Public economics has positive and normative objectives; it aims both to describe the 
effects of public policies and to evaluate them.  This agenda requires us to formulate models of 
human decision-making with two components – one describing choices, and the other describing 
well-being.    Using  the  first  component,  we  can  forecast  the  effects  of  policy  reforms  on 
individuals’ actions, as well as on prices and allocations.  Using the second component, we can 
determine whether these changes benefit consumers or harm them. 
  Traditionally, economists have made no distinction between the behavioral and welfare 
components of economic models.  Such a distinction has not been necessary because standard 
welfare analysis is grounded in the doctrine of revealed preference.  That is, we infer what people 
want from what they choose.  When evaluating policies, we attempt to act as each individual’s 
proxy,  extrapolating  his  or  her  likely  policy  choices  from  observed  consumption  choices  in 
related situations. 
  Interest  in  behavioral  economics  has  grown  in  recent  years,  stimulated  largely  by 
accumulating  evidence  that  the  standard  model  of  consumer  decision-making  provides  an 
inadequate positive description of human behavior.  Scholars have begun to propose alternative 
models  that  incorporate  insights  from  psychology  and  neuroscience.    Some  of  the  pertinent 
literature focuses on behaviors commonly considered “dysfunctional,” such as addiction, obesity, 
risky sexual behavior, and crime.   However, there is also considerable interest in  alternative 
approaches to more standard economic problems involving, for example, saving, risk-taking, and 
charitable contributions. 
  Behavioral  economists  have  proposed  a  variety  of  models  that  raise  difficult  issues 
concerning welfare evaluation.  No consensus concerning appropriate standards and criteria has 
yet emerged.  Broadly speaking, there are two main schools of thought. 
  One school of thought insists on strict adherence to the doctrine of revealed preference 
for the purpose of economic policy evaluation.  In this view, observed “anomalies” should be 
explained, when possible, by expanding the preference domain.  Indeed, in the view of some 
economists, the only legitimate objective of behavioral economics is to identify preferences that 
robustly rationalize choices (Gul and Pesendorfer [2001,2004a,b]).  This perspective maintains 
the tight correspondence between the behavioral and welfare components of economic models. 
  A  second  school  of  thought  holds  that  behavioral  economics  can  in  principle  justify 
modifying, relaxing, or even jettisoning the principle of revealed preference for the purpose of   3 
welfare analysis.   A number of possibilities have been explored.   If people make systematic 
mistakes in identifiable circumstances, it may be appropriate to apply the principle of revealed 
preference selectively rather than systematically.  If an individual’s choices reveal several distinct 
sets of mutually inconsistent preferences, then normative evaluation may require the adoption of a 
particular perspective.  If choices do not reveal coherent preferences, then perhaps normative 
evaluations should emphasize other aspects of well-being, such as opportunities.  To pursue any 
of  these  possibilities,  one  must  formulate  separate,  and  potentially  divergent,  positive  and 
normative models. 
  Adopting alternatives to the principle of revealed preference allows economists to engage 
on issues that specialists in other fields, as well as the public at large, regard as central policy 
concerns.  For example, they can meaningfully address the “self-destructive” behavior of addicts 
or make sense of the claim that American’s save “too little” for retirement. 
  However, there is also a danger.  Revealed preference is an attractive political principle 
because it guards against abuse (albeit quite imperfectly in practice).  Once we relax this doctrine, 
we potentially legitimize government condemnation of almost any chosen lifestyle on the grounds 
that it is contrary to a “natural” welfare criterion reflecting the individual's “true” interests.  If we 
can  classify,  say,  the  consumption  of  an  addictive  substance  as  contrary  to  an  individual’s 
interests, what about choices involving literature, religion, or sexual orientation?  If choices do 
not  unambiguously  reveal  an  individual's  notions  of  good  and  bad,  then  “true  preferences” 
become the subject of debate, and every “beneficial” restriction of personal choice becomes fair 
game.
2 
  Given  these  dangers,  if  we  are  to  relax  the  principle  of  revealed  preference  when 
evaluating  public  policy,  it  behooves  us  to  set  a  high  scientific  threshold  for  reaching  a 
determination, based on objective evidence, that a given problem calls for divergent positive and 
normative models.  It is important to emphasize that any justification for modifying or replacing 
the principle of revealed preference must necessarily appeal to evidence other than observations 
of choice.  After all, in the absence of additional assumptions, it is impossible to disprove the 
hypothesis that people prefer what they choose simply by examining their choices.  As we argue 
in  detail  below,  this  is  one  respect  in  which  direct  evidence  on  the  neural  mechanisms  of 
decision-making is beginning to prove valuable. 
  Unfortunately, behavioral economists have typically been somewhat cavalier in adopting 
normative  criteria.    For  example,  in  the  literature  on  quasi-hyperbolic  discounting,  it  is now 
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standard practice to adopt the “long-run” perspective (β = 1) for welfare analysis, rather than the 
perspective that governs “short-run” choices (β < 1).  This approach has been criticized on the 
grounds that, according to the principle of revealed preference, the short-run perspective also has 
status as a welfare criterion.  The arguments that have been offered in defense of the “long-run” 
perspective have not convinced skeptics that it is appropriate to attach absolutely no normative 
significance  to  short-run  preferences.    The  foundations  for  welfare  analysis  therefore  require 
closer attention.  
  This paper has two goals.   First,  we discuss emerging methods for normative policy 
analysis in behavioral economics, as well as potentially fruitful lines of inquiry.  We explicitly 
argue against the view that any departure from the doctrine of revealed preference renders welfare 
analysis either infeasible or entirely subjective.  Instead, we argue that it is sometimes possible to 
replace revealed preference  with other compelling normative principles.  For example, if one 
knows enough about the nature of decision-making malfunctions, it may be possible to recover 
tastes by relying on a selective application of the revealed preference principle.  Accordingly, 
practicing behavioral economics requires us to modify – not to abandon – the key methodological 
principles of modern economics (see Rabin [2002] for a related argument). 
Second, we review a collection of applications of behavioral economics to the field of 
public economics.  In preparing this selective review, we have intentionally favored depth over 
breadth  in  the  hope  of  providing  a  substantive  discussion  of  welfare  issues  and  policy 
implications.    We  focus  on  three  specific  policy  issues:  saving,  addiction,  and  public  goods.  
While  each  literature  is  still  in  its  infancy,  we  argue  that  behavioral  economics  has  already 
provided fundamental insights concerning public policy in each of these domains. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized  as follows.   Section 2 discusses alternative 
approaches to the problem of welfare.  This section is an abbreviated version of Bernheim and 
Rangel [2005a], to which we refer the reader for additional details.  Section 3, 4 and 5 survey 
applications to, respectively, saving, addictive substances, and public goods.  Section 6 provides a 
brief discussion the future of behavioral public economics. 
2. Conceptualizing and Measuring Welfare 
 
  Welfare analysis has two main components.  First, one determines how policies affect the 
well-being of each individual.  Second, one aggregates across individuals.  As is well-known, the 
second step involves some thorny issues (e.g., those raised by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem).    5 
However, since these are common to both neoclassical and behavioral approaches, we will say no 
more about them.  Instead, we will focus on the assessment of each individual’s well-being.   
  There is widespread agreement that normative  criteria should respect the principle of 
individual sovereignty, which holds that notions of good and bad for society should be rooted in 
the notions of good and bad held by the affected individuals.  This principle instructs policy 
analysts to act as each individual's proxy when comparing alternative policies.  It precludes the 
analyst from imposing his or her own value judgments.  Our focus here is, in effect, on the 
meaning of the phrase, “acting as each individual’s proxy.” 
In the neoclassical paradigm, the analyst attempts to determine which policy choice the 
individual  would  make,  given  the  opportunity.    This  is  obviously  difficult,  since  the  policy 
choices under consideration differ considerably from the private choices that people ordinarily 
make.  The beauty and power of standard consumer theory resides in the fact that it allows us to 
extrapolate choices among public policy outcomes from observations of private choices.  
  One common interpretation of the neoclassical approach is that people have well-defined 
preference rankings which the analyst discovers by examining evidence on choices (through the 
principle  of  revealed  preference).    These  rankings  are  then  taken  as  the  basis  for  welfare 
evaluations.    As  detailed  in  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2005a],  this  interpretation  rests  on  the 
following four assumptions. 
  Assumption  1:  Coherent  preferences.    Each  individual  has  coherent,  well-behaved 
preferences. 
  Assumption 2: Preference domain.  The domain of each individual’s preference rankings 
is the set of lifetime state-contingent consumption paths. 
  Assumption 3: Fixed lifetime preferences.  Each individual’s ranking of lifetime state-
contingent consumption paths remains constant across time and states of nature. 
  Assumption  4:  No  mistakes.    Each  individual  always  selects  the  most  preferred 
alternative from the feasible set. 
  It is important to emphasize that the third assumption does not rule out the possibility that 
tastes vary over time or across states of nature.  To illustrate, consider the following problem: 
choose either an immediate five-day vacation, or a ten-day vacation after a three month delay.  
The third assumption allows for the possibility that the preferred choice changes with age, or 
fluctuates randomly with mood.  For example, if an individual is under stress, the immediate 
vacation may be more attractive. The assumption does not, however, allow for the possibility that, 
while in a relaxed mood, the individual would wish to prescribe for himself a different choice 
than he would actually make at other points in time while in an stressed mood.  On the contrary,   6 
while in a relaxed mood, he should regard the decisions he makes at other points in time while in 
stressed moods as optimal.  Though he is willing to make different tradeoffs at different points in 
time and in different states of nature, his notion of a “life well-lived” remains fixed. 
Another  interpretation  of  the  neoclassical  approach,  discussed  at  greater  length  in 
Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2005a],  holds  that  revealed  preferences  are  merely  constructs  for 
systematizing information concerning choices.  This view does not require one to take a position 
as to whether people actually have preferences, or whether revealed preferences coincide with 
“true”  preferences.    Rather,  it  posits  that  people  act  as  if  they  optimize  given  particular 
preferences,  and  uses  this  representation  to  extrapolate  choices  among  policy  alternatives.  
According to this view, the neoclassical paradigm is only about choice.   
Throughout the remainder of this section, we adopt the perspective that preferences are 
“real” objects.  In our view, the concept of preference is something that we all understand in 
concrete terms.  Even if we are limited to inferring others’ preferences from their choices, this 
does not call the existence of preferences into question.  After all, most of us believe we can learn 
much about our own preferences  from introspection.  None of us have  ever  chosen between 
spending two weeks on Maui and two years in prison, yet we know we would be happier with the 
first  alternative;  we  do  not  need  to  infer  this  preference  from  an  actual  choice.    From  this 
perspective, the discovery of true preferences is a central objective of welfare economics.  
One can think of the various approaches to welfare analysis that have appeared in the 
behavioral literature as efforts to grapple with the distinctive issues that arise when we relax each 
of the four assumptions listed above.  We will consider each of them in turn. 
2.A. Relaxing the first assumption (coherent preferences) 
The  first  assumption  holds  that  people  have  well-defined,  coherent  preferences.    If 
observed choices are highly context-dependent, with significant decisions turning on minor and 
seemingly irrelevant aspects of framing (see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman [1986]), then it may be 
appropriate to assume that people have poorly behaved or incoherent preferences (or possibly no 
preferences at all).  In this case, how does one evaluate an individual’s well-being? 
  One possibility is to abandon the principle that the welfare criterion used to evaluate 
public policy should be based on individual notions of good and bad allocations.  Unlike the 
standard approach, this leads to a sharp separation between positive models describing choice, 
and normative models describing welfare.  One interesting example of this approach appears in 
Sugden [2004], who argues for a notion of welfare based on opportunities.  Sugden formulates a 
rigorous welfare criterion along these lines, and proves a counterpart to the first welfare theorem.   7 
  There are many practical and philosophical reasons to consider welfare standards based 
on opportunities rather than allocations (see, e.g., Cohen [1989], Sen [1992], and Roemer [1998]).  
This certainly simplifies some aspects of measurement, and it avoids the need to systematize 
behavioral observations by imposing untested assumptions.  Yet we suspect that most economists 
will resist such a radical departure from the standard approach.  Even if we acknowledge that 
opportunities  are  important,  people  also  appear  to  care  a  great  deal  about  allocations  and 
subjective perceptions of well-being.  And while there is some evidence of context-dependence 
and incoherence, we doubt anyone would claim that preferences are entirely incoherent (e.g., one 
can’t induce the typical person to exchange two weeks at a resort in Maui for two years in prison 
by  manipulating  framing).    An  approach  based  exclusively  on  opportunities  would  appear  to 
ignore this potentially valuable information. 
2.B. Relaxing the second assumption (preference domain) 
  Some  behavioral  anomalies  that  defy  explanation  within  the  standard  approach  may 
become explicable if we expand the preference domain.  Conceptually, this permits us to conduct 
welfare analysis by applying the principle of revealed preference, as in the standard approach 
(that is, we can use essentially the same model to describe choices and welfare).  We discuss two 
examples. 
  The first example involves temptation and self-control.  Motivating behavioral anomalies 
include evidence of apparent time-inconsistency and various forms of precommitment.  Gul and 
Pesendorfer  [2001]  argue  that  it  is  possible  to  account  for  a  range  of  otherwise  puzzling 
behavioral observations if preferences are defined over both allocations and choice sets (see also 
Gul and Pesendorfer [2004a,b]).  If some choices feel tempting when they are available, and if 
this detracts from well-being, then an individual may prefer small choice sets to large ones.  This 
provides  a  reason  to  constrain  future  alternatives  even  when  constraints  have  no  impact  on 
choices.  In the Gul-Pesendorfer framework, a desire to constrain future choices does not imply 
that preferences change over time.  On the contrary, as in the standard framework, the individual 
applies the same set of lifetime preferences at every moment in time.  Even though, at time t, he 
might wish to constrain his available options for time s > t, he nevertheless approves of the choice 
he would actually make at time s in the absence of this constraint (because he understands the 
significance of temptation).  In this framework, if one imposes suitable structure on choice data, 
one can discover lifetime preferences over allocations and choice sets by applying the principle of 
revealed preference, and one can use these preferences to make welfare evaluations, just as in the 
standard approach.   8 
  The  second  example  involves  social  preferences.    Motivating  behavioral  anomalies 
include, among others, a tendency to give money away in settings where there is no room for 
reciprocity (see, e.g., Camerer [2003] for a review of evidence on the dictator game), an apparent 
aversion to inequality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000]), and a 
desire to conform to group norms (see Jones [1984] for a review of pertinent evidence).  For the 
purpose  of  positive  modeling,  behavioral  economists  frequently  assume  that  preferences  are 
defined not only over an individual’s own consumption bundle, but also over social outcomes, 
such as the consumption bundles of others.   If one imposes suitable structure on choice data, one 
can once again discover these tastes by applying the principle of revealed preference.  These 
preferences  provide  a  foundation  for  normative  evaluation  (in  other  words,  one  again  uses 
essentially the same model to describe choices and welfare).   
2.C. Relaxing the third assumption (fixed lifetime preferences) 
The third assumption states that preferences over lifetime state-contingent consumption 
paths  do  not  change  over  time  or  across  states  of  nature.    Behavioral  anomalies  motivating 
relaxation of this assumption include, again, evidence of apparent time-inconsistency and various 
forms of precommitment.  From a positive perspective, a common modeling strategy involves 
endowing the individual with different well-behaved lifetime preferences at different points in 
time (Laibson [1997], O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999b, 2001]); one could, of course, also allow 
lifetime  preferences  to  vary  across  states  of  nature  (Loewenstein  [1996],  Loewenstein  and 
O’Donoghue [2004]).  Assuming we’ve properly measured these preferences, welfare analysis 
requires us, in effect, to adjudicate conflicts among them.  The problem is analogous to welfare 
aggregation involving many individuals; here, we aggregate over multiple “selves.” 
One branch of the literature exploits this analogy.  Effectively, it envisions person A at 
time t as the “child” of person  A at time t-1.   It then applies standard  multi-person  welfare 
principles.  One possibility is to apply the Pareto criterion (see, e.g., Phelps and Pollack [1968], or 
Laibson [1997] and Battacharya and Lakdawalla [2004] for recent examples).  The main problem 
with this approach is that the criterion is not very discerning.  As a result, it is often impossible to 
rank interesting classes of policies.  One usually ends up being able to offer policy makers little in 
the  way  of  clear  guidance.    A  second  possibility  is  to  aggregate  preferences  through  the 
application of some welfare function.  As in problems with multiple consumers, one can write 
down a class of well-behaved aggregators (i.e., the analog of Samuelson-Bergson social welfare 
functions) and attempt to derive general results.  However, unless one has a basis for making 
specific  assumptions  about  the  aggregator,  this  approach  fails  to  sharpen  the  prescriptions   9 
generated from application of the Pareto criterion.  Alternatively, one could in principle provide 
the policy maker with a mapping from properties of the aggregator (e.g., welfare weights) to 
prescriptions.   
A second branch of the literature makes welfare evaluations based on some reasonably 
stable component of preferences.  For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999b] argue for the 
application of a “long-run” welfare criterion (β = 1) in models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  
In Bernheim and Rangel [2005a], we provide a formal justification of this criterion based on 
aggregation  principles.    In  particular,  we  demonstrate  that  if  the  consumer’s  horizon  is 
sufficiently long, and if the policy analyst applies any member of a large class of well-behaved 
aggregators, the resulting welfare criterion is “close” to long-run preferences.  The intuition for 
this result is that the consumer judges tradeoffs between period t and t + 1 by exactly the same 
criteria in all periods but one, and the influence of any one “self” must decline to zero as the 
number of selves becomes large. 
One  can make a similar point concerning states of nature.   To illustrate, consider an 
individual who lives in continuous time.  Choices are essentially instantaneous but have long-
lasting consequences (as an example, think of drug use).  The individual’s mental state is either 
“cold,”  which  corresponds to one set of lifetime preferences, or  “hot,”  which  corresponds to 
another.    Normally,  the  individual operates  in  a  cold  mode.    At  each  moment,  there’s  some 
chance that he enters the hot state, which has a fixed duration of ε.  Suppose we model the arrival 
of the hot state as a failure-time process, with a fixed hazard parameter.  As ε approaches zero, 
the fraction of time spent in the cold state converges to unity.  Accordingly, if we aggregate 
preferences  according  to  the  frequency  with  which  they  prevail,  we  end  up  using  the  cold 
preferences for normative analysis.  Even so, cold preferences do not describe behavior in this 
limit.  Since hot states can create “momentary lapses” with long-lasting effects, the appropriate 
positive  and  normative  models  diverge.    See  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2005a]  for  a  formal 
treatment. 
2.D. Relaxing the fourth assumption (no mistakes) 
The  fourth  assumption  holds  that  choice  and  preferences  do  not  diverge.    Gul  and 
Pesendorfer [2002] defend this assumption as follows: “Revealed preference theory defines the 
interest of people to be what they do.  Since there is no objective standard of self-interested 
behavior it is unclear what it would mean for an agent to act against his self-interest.”   10 
Yet there  are clearly situations where virtually everyone would agree that divergence 
does occur – where a choice is obviously not in someone's interest.  There are also situations in 
which most would agree that public policy should recognize these divergences. 
Consider the following example.  American visitors in London suffer numerous injuries 
and fatalities because they often look only to the left before stepping into streets, even though 
they know traffic approaches from the right.  This is a systematic pattern; one can't dismiss it as 
an isolated incident.  A literal application of the revealed preference compels us to conclude 
either that these people simply have a very strong preference look left, or that they're masochistic. 
If  we  use  these  revealed  preferences  for  welfare  analysis,  there's  no  legitimate  basis  for 
preventing  someone  from  stepping  in  front  of  a  truck.    And  yet,  it's  safe  to  say  that,  after 
recognizing the purpose of the intervention, anyone would be grateful.  The pedestrian's objective 
-- to cross the street safely -- is clear, and the decision is plainly a mistake. 
As another example, consider the treatment of children.  Few economists would apply 
notions of consumer sovereignty and revealed preference to evaluate the welfare of a child.  We 
acknowledge that children do not know what's best, and that their actions often fail to reflect valid 
preferences, probably because they give insufficient weight to consequences. Policies prohibiting 
the sale of cigarettes and alcohol to minors are therefore relatively uncontroversial.  And yet, it's 
difficult to justify, objectively, the sense in which the revealed preferences of an irresponsible 
nineteen-year-old are legitimate, whereas those of a fourteen-year-old are not.  While turning 
eighteen  has  profound  legal  significance,  it  doesn't  discontinuously  change  the  mechanics  of 
decision-making. 
There are other contexts for which revealed preference seems untenable as a guiding 
principle  for  public  policy  evaluation.  For  example,  when  people  have  sufficiently  severe 
diagnosed  psychiatric  disorders,  the  state  can  and  should  step  in  to  protect  them.    Eating 
disorders,  while not quite  as extreme, provide another illustration. For the purpose of public 
policy, we probably should not proceed on the assumption that an anorexic's refusal to eat is just 
an expression of valid preferences. On the contrary, we should and generally do regard this as 
dysfunctional.  These examples are instructive because they suggest that, in some circumstances, 
it is reasonable to use evidence of brain process malfunctions – something other than choice data 
– to trump the principle of revealed preference.  In these situations, denying the possibility of 
mistakes while rigidly adhering to the principle of revealed preference guarantees the use of an 
improper welfare criterion. 
So far, we have confined our discussion to “dysfunctional” choices.  More generally, 
almost any behavioral anomaly motivating some relaxation of the first three assumptions can also   11 
motivate relaxation of the fourth.  For example, evidence of time-inconsistent present-bias may 
reflect a systematic tendency to “over-consume.”  Likewise, people may make precommitments 
to prevent themselves from repeating a pattern of mistakes.   
A natural analytic strategy involves endowing the individual with well-behaved lifetime 
preferences, while simultaneously specifying a decision process (or decision criterion) that does 
not necessarily involve selecting the maximal element in the preference ordering.  To conduct 
positive  analysis,  one  employs  a  model  of  the  decision  process  (or  criterion).    To  conduct 
normative  analysis,  one  uses  a  model  of  lifetime  preferences.    In  contrast  to  the  standard 
approach, these positive and normative models potentially diverge. 
Our model of addiction (Bernheim and Rangel [2004]), discussed in greater detail below, 
exemplifies  this  approach.    We  assume  that  people  attempt  to  optimize  given  their  true 
preferences, but randomly encounter conditions that trigger systematic mistakes, the likelihood of 
which evolves with previous substance use.  One can also interpret the familiar model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting along similar lines (indeed, many of those who advocate this model favor 
this interpretation).  In this interpretation, present-biased behavior is a mistake that results from 
the decision making processes’ tendency to place too much weight on immediate rewards relative 
to future rewards.
3 
In  justifying  and implementing  this  approach,  we  encounter  two  critical  and  difficult 
issues.  First, how do we know that choices and preferences diverge?  That is, what is the basis 
for overturning the principle of revealed preference?  Second, if we find compelling evidence of 
divergence, how do we identify preferences empirically?  Both questions are addressed in the 
literature, though not in a single paper. 
1. Criteria for overturning revealed preferences.  With respect to the first issue, it is 
important to acknowledge that, strictly speaking, it is impossible to overturn the principle of 
revealed preference using only observations of choices.  While choice experiments can overturn 
specific structural assumptions, overturning the principle itself necessarily requires other types of 
evidence.  It is always possible to rationalize choice data by assuming that tastes are sufficiently 
context-specific. 
One promising approach is to use evidence from neuroscience and psychology on the 
neural processes at work in decision making.  For example, if it is possible to isolate a process 
that provides inputs for decision-making, and to show that this process either has substantive 
limitations,  or  that  it  malfunctions  under  identifiable  circumstances,  then  the  evidence  may 
provide a foundation both for asserting the existence of errors, and for a particular reduced-form 
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model of the error-producing mechanism.  In this regard, brain processes of particular interest 
include  those  involved  in  anticipating  and  evaluating  the  outcomes  of  different  choices, 
remembering  pertinent  information  (memory),  and  attending  to  relevant  data  and  options 
(attention).  An example of this approach appears in Bernheim and Rangel [2004], where we 
argue  that  addictive  substances  interfere  with  the  proper  operation  of  an  automatic  neural 
forecasting system, thereby skewing decisions.  We elaborate on this example in Section 4.E, 
below.   
  2. Strategies for identifying preferences.  With respect to the second issue, it may be 
possible in a given instance to identify preferences by interpreting the available data through the 
lens of structural modeling.  This approach requires one to formulate two tightly parameterized 
models – one for preferences, and one for choices.  Ideally, it should be possible to justify the 
major structural assumptions of the decision-making model through the type of neurological and 
psychological evidence used to establish the existence of a discrepancy between preferences and 
choices.   
As long as true preferences influence choices, even if the individual does not optimize, 
there will be some relationship between the parameters of the positive and normative models, and 
this will be useful for purposes of identification.  Indeed, for the two examples mentioned so far 
(stochastic  mistakes,  as  in  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2004,  2005b],  and  quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, as in Laibson [1997] and O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999b, 2001]), the parameters of 
the normative model are a subset of the parameters of the positive model (certain parameters 
describe true preferences, and others describe discrepancies between choices and preferences).  
Consequently,  by  estimating  the  positive  model,  one  can  recover  preferences  under  the 
maintained hypothesis that the structural assumptions are correct.   
Ideally, the assumed structure should subsume the possibility that there is no discrepancy 
between  preferences  and  choices,  so  that  it  is  possible  to  test  this  hypothesis.    Both  of  the 
examples considered above satisfy this requirement.     
Identification of preferences through choice data.  As long as the parameters of the 
normative  model  are  a  subset  of  the  parameters  of  the  positive  model,  one  can  in  principle 
estimate these parameters using data on choices, and nothing else.  For example, Laibson et. al. 
[2004] use consumption data to parameterize a model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  This in 
turn implies that it is possible to test the hypothesis of no mistakes (e.g., β=1 in the context of 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting) without considering anything other than choices.  This statement 
seems inconsistent with the principle that it is impossible to falsify the principle of revealed 
preference with choice data alone.  The explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that one   13 
tests the hypothesis of no mistakes jointly with the assumptions of the structural model.  Even if 
this joint hypothesis is rejected, there is some other structural model for which the hypothesis of 
no mistakes would not be rejected.  When interpreting the results, one therefore necessarily relies 
on the non-choice evidence used to justify the assumed structure.  Accordingly, the reliability and 
strength of this non-choice evidence limits the force of one’s conclusions.   
The observations in the preceding paragraph remain valid even if one uses data on non-
standard types of choices, such as decisions made in advance of consequences, precommitments, 
and expenditures on self-control.  For any given structural decision-making model, this type of 
evidence may prove extremely useful from the perspective of estimating parameters precisely and 
convincingly, and it may allow one to reject the hypothesis of no mistakes for a much broader 
class  of  preferences  (e.g.,  any  preference  for  which  the  decision-maker  would  exhibit  time-
consistent behavior).  However, stepping outside of the assumed structure, there will always be 
other formulations of preferences that can explain the choice data without assuming a divergence 
between preferences and decisions.  Of course, any such formulation will necessarily diverge 
from  the  standard  model  (as  in  Gul  and  Pesendorfer  [2001]),  and,  in  any  given  case, 
rationalization of the data may require strange assumptions about preferences. 
It is worth emphasizing that the estimation of separate positive and normative models 
does not require us to abandon the principle of revealed preference completely.  Instead, one 
implicitly invokes a principle of selectively revealed preference.  Depending on the structural 
model, identifiable decisions (e.g., in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, choices well in 
advance of consequences) may, by assumption, reveal preferences with certainty, or there may be 
uncertainty as to whether a given decision conforms to preferences (as in models with stochastic 
mistakes).  In the latter case, one can model this uncertainty explicitly, proceeding, for example, 
as in the literature on switching regimes. 
Identification  of  preferences  through  both  choice  and  non-choice  data.    Another 
largely  unexplored  possibility  would  involve  the  use  of  both  choice  and  non-choice  data  in 
structural estimation.  Data of potential interest could include self-reported information about 
preferences and/or well-being, as well as measures of physical states such as arousal and stress.   
This additional data could facilitate more precise and reliable estimation of key structural 
parameters.  One might, for example, use self-reported data on preferences along with choice data 
to estimate the parameters of a normative model.  In principle, the normative model could even 
include parameters that do not appear in the positive model.  Likewise, non-choice data might 
prove useful in identifying circumstances in which choices reliably reflect preferences, and those 
in which they do not.  If, for example, there is reason to believe that people are more prone to   14 
make mistakes when they are under stress, data on cortisol levels might help to identify choices 
that more reliably reveal preferences. 
The use of non-choice data raises at least two concerns.  First, one can interpret this data 
through the lens of structural modeling only if one is willing to make additional assumptions, for 
example about how the non-choice data relate to decision-making processes.  Advocates of the 
revealed  preference  approach  view  these  assumptions  with  considerable  suspicion  (Gul  and 
Psendorfer [2001,2004a,b]).  However, an emerging theme in Behavioral Economics is that it is 
possible  to  justify,  defend,  and  test  these  assumptions  through  the  careful  use  of  data  from 
psychology and neuroscience.  Furthermore, in practice the revealed preference approach relies 
on assumptions that are not directly supported by choice data – e.g., structural estimation always 
entails untested restrictions on the form of preferences – and people have different opinions as to 
which of these assumptions are most “reasonable” in a given instance.  To the extent we judge an 
assumption as reasonable based on evidence not involving choice, it behooves us to make the 
basis  of  our  inference  explicit,  regardless  of  whether  we  follow  the  standard  approach  or  a 
behavioral  alternative.    One  cannot  claim  an  advantage  for  the  standard  approach  simply  by 
sweeping the implicit reliance on non-choice evidence under the rug, or by theorizing about an 
idealized procedure that is impossible to follow in practice (see Bernheim and Rangel [2005a] 
and Koszegi [2002] for elaborations of this point). 
Second,  economists  generally  view  non-choice  data  as  significantly  less  reliable  and 
considerably more ambiguous than information on choices.  In part, this view is justified by 
evidence indicating that certain types of self-reported data are unreliable (Diamond and Hausman 
[1994], Schwarz and Strack [1999]).  In our view, this deficiency is exaggerated, particularly with 
regard to evidence concerning limitations and malfunctions of specific brain processes involving 
forecasting, memory, and attention (as discussed above).  There is every reason to believe that the 
quality of this and other non-choice evidence, as well as our ability to interpret it, will improve 
with time.  Furthermore, given the potential value of non-choice data, concerns about the quality 
of  this  information  should  motivate  the  development  of  better  procedures  for  acquiring  and 
interpreting it, rather than a policy of ignoring it on “conceptual” grounds. 
  We conclude this section by acknowledging two concerns.  First, the feasibility and value 
of the empirical approach to measuring welfare discussed in this section has yet to be established 
through a series of persuasive applications.  Only a few studies (discussed below) have made a 
start in this direction.  There are many unresolved issues, e.g., concerning how to elicit and use 
data on self-reported preferences.  Nevertheless, at a conceptual level, it does appear that one can   15 
meaningfully conduct empirical welfare analysis allowing for some types of divergences between 
preferences and choices. 
Second,  there  are  significant  political  dangers  associated  with  the  research  agenda 
described in this section.  As we mentioned in Section 1, revealed preference is an attractive 
political principle because it prevents critics of any particular choice (e.g., concerning literature, 
sexual orientation, or religion) from condemning it on the grounds that it is contrary to a “natural” 
welfare criterion reflecting the individual's "true" interests.  While we do not condone casual 
departures from this principle, we do think it is possible to insist on a high standard of proof, 
based in scientific evidence.  In classifying certain behavioral patterns, such as psychoses, eating 
disorders, and addiction, as mental illnesses, the medical profession has grappled with essentially 
the same issues.  While there have certainly been some dubious decisions (e.g., the classification, 
until  relatively  recently,  of  homosexuality  as  a  psychiatric  disorder),  the  process  has,  on  the 
whole, reflected the balanced application of sound scientific principles. 
 
3. Saving  
 
For  more  that  fifty  years,  the  framework  of  intertemporal  utility  maximization  has 
dominated economists’ thinking about personal saving.  This framework traces its roots to Irving 
Fisher (1930), and lies at the heart of the Life Cycle Hypothesis articulated by Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954).  In recent years it has become controversial, and an increasing number of 
economists have expressed doubts concerning its general validity.  Many have turned to new 
approaches.  
In  this  section,  we  survey  some  of  the  pertinent  empirical  evidence  motivating  the 
growing interest in alternatives to the standard model, describe some leading behavioral models, 
and explore some of their key policy implications.  Our objective is to cover central themes. 
Given the size and rapid growth of this literature, we make no attempt to be comprehensive. Also, 
in  describing  competing  models  of  saving,  we  focus  on  basic  formulations,  and  ignore 
complications arising from liquidity constraints, intertemporal complementarities, and uncertainty 
about length of life and market parameters. 
 
  3.A. The policy issues 
The last few decades have witnessed sharp declines in rates of saving for many developed 
countries.  For example, according to statistics from the National Income and Product Accounts   16 
(NIPA), the rate of net national saving for the U.S. dropped from 8.3 percent of net national 
product in 1980 to 1.8 percent in 2003.  Low rates of saving have created widespread concern 
over  investment,  growth,  the  balance  of  payments,  and  the  financial  security  of  individual 
households.    As  a  result,  policymakers  worldwide  have  become  increasingly  interested  in 
developing strategies for stimulating thrift.   
Public policies affecting private saving are highly contentious.  In the U.S., policy makers 
are currently debating a variety of critical questions: Should the US partially replace its traditional 
social security system with individual savings accounts? If so, how should we structure the new 
system?  Should  the  government  impose  more  stringent  regulations  on  defined  contribution 
pension plans, which appear to be replacing defined benefit plans at a steady rate?  Should we 
create  or  expand  tax-deferred  savings  accounts  for  special  needs,  such  as  medical  care  and 
education?  Or should we consider more fundamental tax reform that would reduce or eliminate 
the tax burden on capital income across the board? 
To  answer  these  and  other  critical  questions,  public  economists  require  a  theory  of 
personal financial decision making that can explain observed behavior and generate credible out-
of-sample  predictions.    It  must  also  provide  clear  answers  to  normative  questions,  such  as 
whether people save enough for retirement, and whether they invest their savings wisely.    
 
  3.B. The neoclassical perspective on saving 
  We begin by reviewing a simple version of the standard model.  An individual lives for 
T+1 periods.  In each period t = 0,…,T, he consumes ct units of an aggregate consumption good.  
His preferences are defined over consumption bundles of the form c = (c0,…,cT).  We assume that 
it is possible to represent these preferences with a separable utility function of the form 
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where δ is a constant rate of time preference.  The individual selects a consumption bundle from 
some feasible set, which reflects the distribution of earnings over time, interest rates, liquidity 
constraints, and the like.  In practice, he  chooses each element of c sequentially, rather than 
selecting the entire bundle at time 0. However, as time passes, he continues to apply the same 
lifetime preferences.  This means that, as of time s, he evaluates continuation bundles, (cs,…,cT), 
according to the utility function   17 
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  When  writing  down  this  model,  economists  usually  follow  the  convention  of 
renormalizing utility so that A = 1 and B = 0 in every period.  This normalization obscures the 
fact that the individual has the same lifetime preferences at every moment in time.  Since lifetime 
preferences are fixed, the appropriate welfare standard is unambiguous.  Behavior is dynamically 
consistent in the sense that, fixing (c0,…,ct-1), he would choose the same continuation bundle, 
(ct,…,cT),  regardless  of  whether  he  made  the  decision  in  period  t  or  some  prior  period.  
Accordingly, the individual behaves exactly as he would if he chose the entire bundle at time 0, 
which rules out any demand for precommitment.  
  The literature pertaining to the standard model is vast, and we make no attempt to review 
it here.  However, in keeping with our objectives, it is important to summarize some of the key 
implications for public policy.  The neoclassical approach assumes that people make appropriate 
decisions, provided they are well informed.  If the government can provide relevant information 
more  effectively  and  efficiently  than  private  markets,  educational  policies  are  potentially 
beneficial.  Assuming information is not an issue, there is no role for government in the absence 
of pre-existing distortions.  It may be appropriate for the government to tax or subsidize capital 
income as part of a second-best policy in the presence of revenue requirements, to ensure an 
adequate level of competition in financial markets, to minimize fraud, and to alleviate adverse 
selection problems.  However,  under the standard view, there is nothing wrong with the choices 
people  make,  given  the  constraints  they  face.    Reasons  for  government  intervention  involve 
market failures, not individual decision-making failures.   
  In practice, policy makers worry that people are not saving enough for their own security 
and future well-being.  This is part of the motivation for proposals involving subsidized saving 
and/or  mandatory  accumulation.    The  standard  model  does  not,  however,  recognize  the 
legitimacy of this concern (except insofar as it results from a market failure).  Under this view, 
saying that someone saves “too little” is comparable to asserting that he or she doesn’t listen to 
enough  classical  music  –  thrift  is  simply  a  matter  of  taste  (Lazear  [1994]).    In  contrast,  if 
households potentially make systematic mistakes, the adequacy of saving becomes a well-posed 
and important empirical issue.   18 
  In the ensuing sections, we review some of the evidence that calls the legitimacy of the 
standard  approach  into  question,  and  we  explore  the  implications  of  several  emerging 
alternatives.     
 
  3.C. Some problematic observations 
  In some respects, saving behavior conforms reasonably well to the predictions of the 
Life-Cycle Hypothesis.  For example, most people tend to accumulate wealth, broadly defined to 
include things like pension and social security entitlements, over the course of their  working 
lives, and use either some or all of it to finance consumption after retirement.  Yet there are also 
sound reasons to question the general applicability of this model and to examine alternatives.  
Here  we  list  a  number  of  problematic  patterns  identified  in  the  literature.    While  it  may  be 
possible to account for some of these within the context of the Life-Cycle framework, collectively 
they pose a serious challenge to this approach.  
1.  Changes  in  consumption  near  retirement.    The  standard  framework  implies  that 
people should smooth consumption, avoiding sudden and predictable changes in living standard.  
Yet  a  variety  of  studies  have  found  that  consumption  declines  sharply  at  retirement,  when 
households experience a predictable decline in disposable income (Hammermesh [1984], Mariger 
[1987],  Hausman  and  Paquette  [1987],  Robb  and  Burbridge  [1989],  Banks  et.  al.  [1998], 
Bernheim et. a. [2001]).  The decline in consumption is strongly correlated with accumulated 
wealth; those who accumulate less experience larger declines (Bernheim et. al [2001]).  
One can try to account for this pattern within the standard model in several ways.  First, 
retirement may be associated with a decline in work-related expenses and/or consumption goods 
that are substitutes for leisure.  If these effects are anticipated, and if their magnitudes vary across 
the population, then people who plan for larger spending cuts after retirement will intentionally 
accumulate less wealth.  Yet the evidence does not support this interpretation, as the effect is 
equally  strong  for  categories  of  spending  that  would  appear  complementary  to  leisure  and 
unrelated to work (Bernheim et. al. [2001]).  Second, for those who stop working earlier than 
expected  (e.g.,  due  to  disability),  retirement  reflects  “bad  news”  to  which  consumption  must 
adjust.    Moreover,  these  same  individuals  find  themselves  with  less-than-average  wealth  at 
retirement.    However,  even  when  the  effects  of  unexpected  retirement  are  removed  through 
statistical procedures, one still observes both a decline in consumption at retirement, and a strong 
correlation between the size of this effect and accumulated wealth. 
Notably, the sharp drop in consumption at retirement is also larger for households with 
lower  rates  of  income  replacement  from  social  security  and  pension  plans  (Bernheim  et.  a.   19 
[2001]).  Once again, this pattern is observed even when the effects of unexpected retirement are 
removed.  Since income replacement rates are easily anticipated, and since this variable is not 
likely to be strongly correlated with work-related expenses or a preference for leisure substitutes, 
standard theory is hard-pressed to account for the evidence.  
This evidence  would appear to indicate that people reduce consumption at retirement 
because they are surprised, either by the decline in their disposable income or by the inadequacy 
of their accumulated wealth.  Yet other evidence suggests that the decline in consumption at 
retirement is anticipated (Hurd and Rohwedder [2003]).  The explanation for this apparent puzzle 
remains an open question.   
2. Self-reported mistakes.  Several studies document large gaps between self-reported 
behavior and self-reported plans and/or preferences.  A large fraction of the population reports 
saving too little – that is, significantly less than planned, or less than appropriate – for retirement 
(Bernheim [1995], Farkas and Johnson [1997], Choi et. al. [2004]).  The reported gap is quite 
large, and few people report saving too much.  Of those who express an intention to increase their 
saving,  only  a small  fraction  follow  through  (Choi et.  al.  [2004]).    Taking  these  self-reports 
literally, one would conclude that pro-saving policies are potentially welfare-improving. 
Skeptics  counter  that  people  are  inclined  to  report  “ideal”  or  “virtuous”  behavior  in 
answer to questions about plans or preferences; they might well also report that they watch too 
much television.  This is a serious concern.  However, the finding appears to be robust across 
samples, contexts, and phrasing of the pertinent questions.  While the evidence is imperfect, in 
our view it should not be dismissed. 
Others minimize the significance of the self-reported savings gap on the grounds that 
carefully calibrated life-cycle models can replicate data on wealth accumulation (see, e.g., Scholz 
et. al. [2004]).  We find this line of argument unconvincing.  At most, it supports an “as-if” 
interpretation of the life-cycle model.  This does not rule out the possibility that people actually 
do make mistakes.   Within the standard framework, one can rationalize a systematic tendency to 
consume too much as impatience – that is, a low value of δ.   However, if overconsumption is 
indeed a mistake, then the true value of δ is higher than the as-if value, and this rationalization 
leads to an inappropriate welfare criterion.  In addition, the models used to “explain” the level and 
distribution of wealth have other counterfactual implications (e.g., they produce no decline in 
consumption at retirement).  
3. Limited planning skills.  Most people are poorly equipped to engage in life cycle 
planning  without  assistance.    Collectively,  existing  studies  paint  a  rather  bleak  picture  of 
economic and financial literacy (see, e.g., Walstad and Soper [1988], Walstad and :Larsen [1992],   20 
O’Neill [1993], Consumer Federation of America and the American Express Company [1991], 
and Bernheim [1998]).  For example, only 20 percent of adults can determine correct change 
using prices from a menu, and many have trouble determining whether a mortgage rate of 8.6 
percent is better or worse than 8 ¾ percent.  People tend to underestimate the power of compound 
interest, and many poorly understand common financial instruments.   
In  principle,  financially  illiterate  individuals  could  seek  guidance  from  experts.    In 
practice, somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 percent of virtually every population subgroup 
relies primarily on parents, relatives, friends, and personal judgment.  People with less education 
are  actually  more  likely  to  rely  on  their  own  judgment.    Only  a  minority  consults  financial 
professionals or print media (Bernheim [1998]).  Moreover, in some cases financial professionals 
rely on simple rules of thumb (Doyle and Johnson [1991]), and even their relatively sophisticated 
tools conflict in some ways with sound life-cycle planning principles (Bernheim et. al. [2002]). 
Financial literacy is strongly related to behavior.  Those who are less financially literate 
also tend to save less (Bernheim [1998]).   Moreover, measures designed to address financial 
illiteracy appear to have significant effects on choices.  Policies mandating financial education for 
high school students result in higher asset accumulation once exposed students reach adulthood 
(Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki [2001]).  Likewise, financial education in the workplace increases 
participation in employee-directed pension plans and stimulates saving (see Bernheim and Garrett 
[2003], Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz [1996], and Duflo and Saez [2003]). 
4. Failure to formulate sophisticated plans.  Under an “as-if” interpretation, the standard 
model  implies  nothing  about the  process  by  which an  individual  arrives  at  consumption  and 
saving decisions.  Yet it is difficult to see how someone would formulate coherent life-cycle 
choices without extensive and deliberate planning.  In practice, many people report spending little 
if any effort formulating long-range financial plans; moreover, those who fail to plan tend to save 
less (see Bernheim [1994], Lusardi [2000, 2003], Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2003]).   
When  they  exist,  financial  plans  tend  to  be  relatively  unsophisticated.    Many  people 
establish  saving  targets,  and  in  most  cases  think  of  these  targets  as  percentages  of  income.  
However, the targets appear to reflect rough rules of thumb – in the vast majority of cases, they 
are integer multiples of 5 percent, and they vary neither with stated expectations about earnings 
growth nor with age (Bernheim [1994]). 
In  addition,  important  financial  decisions  often  appear  to  turn  on  arguably  irrelevant 
considerations.  People are significantly more likely to make tax-deductible IRA contributions if   21 
they owe the IRS money at the end of the tax year (Feenberg and Skinner [1989]).
4  There is a 
striking tendency for household to make an IRA contribution equal to the single-person limit, 
even when they are eligible to contribute more (Feenberg and Skinner [1989], Engen, Gale, and 
Scholz [1994]).  And IRA participation rates rose sharply when the system was expanded in 
1982, even among groups that had been eligible prior to the expansion, and fell sharply once the 
system was scaled back in 1986, even among groups that remained eligible (Long [1990], Venti 
and Wise [1992]). 
5. The importance of default options.  We use the term “default option” to signify the 
outcome  resulting  from  inaction.    For  a  neoclassical  consumer,  choices  depend  only  on 
preferences and constraints.  Consequently, in the absence of significant transaction costs, default 
options  should  be  inconsequential.    Yet  in  the  context  of  decisions  concerning  saving  and 
investment, they appear to matter a great deal. 
With respect to 401(k) plans, there is considerable evidence that default options affect 
participation  rates,  contribution  rates,  and  portfolios  (Madrian  and  Shea  [2001],  Choi  et.  al. 
[2004a]).    Also,  automatic  cash  distributions  for  terminated  employees  with  small  balances 
reduce retirement account balances, even though these employees are free to roll their funds into 
an  IRA  (Choi  et.  al.  [2004a]).
5    Effects  of  defaults  on  portfolio  allocation  have  also  been 
documented  in  the  context  of  the  recent  privatization  of  social  security  in  Sweden.    The 
dissemination  of  information  about  investment  alternatives  appears  to  counter  this  effect 
(Cronqvist and Thaler [2004]).  
In  the  standard  framework,  defaults  can  matter  if  other  choices  are  associated  with 
significant  transaction  costs.    Yet  in  the  contexts  described  above,  transactions  costs  are 
presumably quite low.  Alternatively, the effect of a default option may be related to the costs of 
decision making.  In pressing this explanation, one must explain why these costs favor the default 
option over other alternatives (e.g., the simplest or most transparent choices).  One possibility is 
that people believe the default conveys information about the wisdom of a particular choice.  This 
may be a plausible assumption in the context of portfolio allocation within 401(k) plans, where 
the employer has a fiduciary responsibility to its employees in its role as plan sponsor.  In any 
case, even if default options are viewed as informative, their strong effects tell us that people 
regularly make significant decisions concerning saving on the basis of precious little information. 
                                                 
4 Gravelle [1991] attributes this to spurious correlations with income, tax filing status, and/or asset holdings, but the 
pattern is apparent even when Feenberg and Skinner include plausible controls for these factors. 
5
Choi et. al. [2004a] also contains a discussion of the “optimal defaults”.   22 
6. Inefficient choices.  In the standard framework, consumers always choose alternatives 
on the efficient frontiers of their constraint sets.  When evaluating evidence pertaining to this 
implication, it would be unfair to interpret it too literally.  In some instances (e.g., failure to 
engage  in  sophisticated  tax  arbitrage),  squeezing  out  the  last  dime  involves  complex 
arrangements and potentially high transaction costs, so the appearance of inefficiency may be 
illusory.  However, in some cases, people select alternatives far from the efficient frontiers of 
their choice sets in settings where superior alternatives are clearly available.  Examples include 
failures  to  take  advantage  of  low  interest  loans  available  through  life  insurance  policies 
(Warshawsky [1987]), naïve diversification strategies (Bernartzi and Thaler [2001]), the tendency 
to invest 401(k) balances heavily in the stock of one’s employer (Holden, Van Der Hei and Quick 
[2000]  and  Bernartzi  [2001]),  the  proclivity  to  maintain  substantial  balances  on  high-interest 
credit cards (Laibson et. al. [2003], Laibson et. al. [2004], Gross and Souleles [2002]), and the 
inclination to delay IRA contributions until the end of the tax year (Summers [1986]). 
 
  3.D. Insights from psychology  
  A number of the empirical puzzles described in the previous section may be related to 
problems involving the exercise of self-control.  There is a sizable and rapidly growing literature 
in psychology and neuroscience concerning the properties, development, and limitations of self-
control processes. In this section we provide a brief introduction to this literature by summarizing 
some of the evidence most relevant for savings. See Frederick,  Loewenstein and O’Dohonue 
[2002] and Loewenstein, Read, and Baumister [2003] for more comprehensive reviews of the 
literature. 
Evidence  of  dynamically  inconsistent  choice.  Saving  reflects  a  decision  to  accept  a 
lower  level  of  consumption  in  one  period  in  exchange  for  a  higher  level  of  consumption  in 
another.    The  standard  model  assumes  that  the  individual  evaluates  a  tradeoff  involving 
consumption at two future fixed points in time, say s and t (with s < t), precisely the same way at 
every moment r.  Yet a large body of evidence finds that this evaluation in fact depends on the 
proximity  of  r  to  s.    In  particular,  when  s  is  sufficiently  proximate,  people  tend  to  favor 
consumption in the closer period s. 
The direct evidence for this proposition is experimental.  The typical experiment involves 
two treatments. In the first, subjects are offered a small prize in s days, or a large prize in t days.  
In the second, they are offered the same small prize in s + d days, or the same large prize in t + d 
days, for some d > 0 (where we interpret d as “delay”).  When s = 0 (that is, the subject decides 
between an immediate reward and a delayed one in the first treatment), a significantly larger   23 
fraction of subjects choose the small prize in the first treatment than in the second (see, e.g.., 
Ainslie and Haendel [1983], or, for a recent review of the evidence, Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue  [2002]).    For  relatively  small  values  of  s  (on  the  order  of  seven  days),  this 
differential disappears (Harrison, Coller, and Rutstrom [2002]). 
The simple experiment described in the previous paragraph potentially suffers from a 
variety  of  confounds.    An  immediate  reward  is  usually  distinguished  by  more  than  just  its 
immediacy.    Arguably,  it  is  less  risky  (that  is,  less  likely  to  be  forgotten  by  the  subject  or 
neglected  by  the  experimenter),  and  it  involves  lower  transaction  costs.    However,  the 
discrepancy  between  the  two  treatments  persists  even  when  reasonable  steps  are  taken  to 
eliminate these confounds.  Another concern is that, with state-contingent utility, evaluations of 
tradeoffs may depend on “moods.”  For an immediate reward, mood is known, while for a future 
reward it is not.  Under appropriate (if somewhat special) assumptions, this can account for the 
observed pattern (Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji [2002]). 
  Notably, similar results are obtained regardless of whether the reward consists of money 
or a consumption good.  This is surprising in that, for a wide range of standard and non-standard 
behavioral theories, the best choice with monetary rewards involves the maximization of present 
discounted value (at least in the absence of binding liquidity constraints), which means it should 
not vary with delay, d. 
  Pre-commitment. People who understand that their behavior is dynamically inconsistent 
might  want  to  exercise  self-control  through  the  use  of  pre-commitment  devices.    There  is 
evidence that this occurs in practice.  For example, Ariely and Wertenbroch [2002] study a field  
experiment in which students are allowed to self-impose deadlines on assignments. They find that 
many subjects choose these constraints. Wertenbroch [1998] discusses suggestive evidence that 
people attempt to control their consumption of “tempting” foods by purchasing small packages, 
even when the unit price is lower for larger packages.  
  The role of cues and cognitive processes in self-control. In an influential study, Shiv and 
Fedorihin [1999] show that cognitive load can affect self-control.  Subjects are given a number to 
memorize, and are asked to report it in another room. In some cases the number has two digits, 
and in others it has seven.  Before reporting the number, they are asked to choose between two 
deserts, chocolate cake and fruit salad, which are physically present.  Individuals in the seven-
digit treatment are roughly 50% more likely to choose the chocolate cake.  This suggests that self-
control requires cognitive effort, and that this becomes more difficult when cognition is engaged 
in other tasks.    24 
  Shiv  and  Fedorihin  [1999]  also  consider  a  variation  of  this  experiment  in  which  the 
deserts  are  not  physically  present;  instead,  subjects  are  shown  pictures.    The  differential  in 
choices between the two treatments disappears.  This suggests that cues can impair self-control. 
To  account  for  this  effect,  psychologists  hypothesize  that  self-control  is  difficult  when  the 
individuals enter strong “visceral states,” and that the real items are more likely than pictures to 
trigger such states. 
  These findings are consistent with the work of Mischel and co-authors, which shows that 
self-control is affected by the deployment of attention and the presence of cues (see Mischel 
[1974],  Mischel  and  Moor  [1973],  Mischel,  Shoda,  and  Rodriguez  [1992]  and  Metcalfe  and 
Mischel [1999]). In a typical experiment, a subject (often a child) is placed in a room and is 
offered a choice between an inferior and a superior prize (one or two pieces of candy). Subjects 
can obtain the inferior prize at any time by calling the experimenter, but must wait until he returns 
to obtain the superior prize. In practice, the child’s ability to wait depends crucially on whether 
the inferior prize is visible. Merely covering the object significantly enhances self-control. 
  More generally, in Mischel’s experiments, the deployment of attention emerges as a key 
determinant of self-control. Any stimulus that focuses attention on the “tempting” features of the 
inferior prize increases the likelihood that the children will select it. Children are significantly 
more likely to wait if they are advised to distract themselves by thinking about something else, or 
if they are provided with a toy, even when children in a control group show no interest in the toy.  
  Discussion.  The evidence suggests that exercising self-control is sometimes difficult. 
The  amount  of  effort  devoted  to  imposing  self-control  appears  to  depend  on  a  variety  of 
environmental  and  contextual  factors  that  are  arguably  unrelated  to  true  preferences.  
Accordingly, lapses in self-control are potentially associated with divergences between choices 
and true preferences (i.e., mistakes).  Moreover, one expects such lapses to arise probabilistically, 
as the result of chance encounters with cues and stimuli outside the individual’s control. 
  The models of decision making described in the next two sections attempt to capture 
these ideas in different ways. They make different assumptions about the nature of the processes 
responsible  for  the  mistakes  associated  with  self-control  lapses,  and  they  employ  different 
reduced-form representations of these processes.  
 
  3.E. Models of saving with quasi-hyperbolic discounting    
   Building on previous work by Strotz [1956], Phelps and Pollack [1968], and Akerlof 
[1991], Laibson [1997] proposes a model of saving intended to capture some of the self-control 
problems  described  in  Sections  3.C  and  3.D.    This  framework  is  widely  known  as  “quasi-  25 
hyperbolic” or “(β,δ)” discounting.
6  From a positive perspective, individuals behave as if they 
optimize subject to lifetime preferences that change with time. In particular, in each period t, the 
decision maker acts as if he picks the feasible consumption path that maximizes a utility function 
of the form 
  u(c





T   ]. 
This formulation differs from the standard model in only one respect: it includes an additional 
discount factor, β  > 0, that is applied to the utility associated with all future consumption. The 
parameter β is meant to represent the degree of present bias, or myopia. The standard model 
corresponds to the special case where β=1.  With β < 1, the present is given special status relative 
to all other time periods, and this creates a powerful tendency to consume immediately. 
  As long as  1     , this model gives rise to dynamically inconsistent behavior.  With β < 
1, the individual always wishes to consume more in the current period than he would have chosen 
for himself at any point in the past.  This complicates positive analysis.  One can no longer 
characterize the individual’s behavior by solving a single optimization problem.  Instead, the 
model gives rise to a game played between “multiple selves.” The literature solves this game 
under  three  different  assumptions  about  the  accuracy  of  the  decision  maker’s  expectations 
concerning his own future behavior.   
A naive individual acts as if his future selves will be willing to follow through on his 
current  plans.    In  this  case,  one  determines  behavior  by  solving  a  sequence  of  optimization 
problems.  In each period, the naïve self divides his resources between current consumption and 
saving, anticipating that he will use his wealth to finance his desired consumption path for the rest 
of his life. He never actually follows this plan because, in the next period, he again attaches 
disproportionate weight to the present.  The naïve individual does not understand his self-control 
problem, and makes no attempt to manage it. 
  A sophisticated decision maker perfectly anticipates his future actions. In particular, he 
knows that, given the opportunity in any future period, he will consume a larger fraction of his 
resources than he would like.  Under this assumption, one determines behavior by solving for the 
sub-game perfect equilibria of the dynamic game played between multiple selves.  Frequently, 
this setting gives rise to multiple equilibria, which means behavior is indeterminate unless one 
applies  a  selection  criterion  or  refinement  (Laibson  [1994],  Krussel  and  Smith  [2003],  and 
Bernheim,  Ray,  and  Yeltekin  [1999]).    In  contrast  to  naïve  decision  makers,  a  sophisticated 
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decision  maker  perfectly  understands  his  self-control  problem,  and  may  attempt  to  manage 
anticipated lapses of self-control by limiting future choices.  
  Finally, a partially sophisticated decision maker understands that he will have a self-
control  problem  in  the  future,  but  underestimates  its  magnitude.    O’Donoghue  and  Rabin 
[1999b,2001] parameterize the degree of sophistication to create a continuum between the two 
extreme cases of complete naivete and perfect sophistication.  See their papers for details, as well 
as for further discussion of the relationships between these assumptions. 
  There has been much confusion in the literature concerning interpretations of the (β,δ)-
model.  This confusion reflects the fact that the positive model described above is consistent with 
at least two distinct approaches to the formulation of a normative model.  One approach follows 
the agenda outlined in section 2.C: think of person A at time t as the “child” of person A at time t-
1, and then apply standard multi-person  welfare principles. The second approach follows the 
agenda  outlined  in  section  2.D:  assume  the  individual  has  stable  lifetime  preferences,  and 
interpret  the  reduced-form  parameter  β  as  measuring  the  tendency  to  make  present-biased 
mistakes.  With few exceptions, the leading advocates of the (β,δ)-model endorse the second 
approach.
7  Typically, they assume that true preferences correspond to a standard intertemporal 
utility function with exponential discounting at the rate δ (“long-run” preferences).
8  Yet much of 
the profession continues to think of the (β,δ)-model literally as one with “multiple selves,” which 
is in keeping with the first approach, but not the second.   
  Several papers have estimated (or calibrated) (β,δ) models using data on consumption 
and saving.  In principle, this permits one to test the hypothesis that β=1.  Under the second 
approach to normative analysis described in the preceding paragraph, it also allows one to recover 
true preferences, and to conduct welfare analysis. 
  Angeletos  et.  al.  (2001)  simulate  a  90  period  life-cycle  model  with  uncertain  labor 
income, probabilistic death, constant discount factors, additively separable preferences, and three 
types of assets: riskless bonds, credit card borrowing, and an illiquid asset resembling housing 
wealth. They calibrate the model to match the median level of wealth near retirement assuming β 
= 1, and again assuming β = 0.7.  Then they compare the model’s ability to track data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) under these two different assumptions.  Both versions 
generate  similar  consumption  patterns,  except  that  borrowing  is  higher  earlier  in  life  and 
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consumption is higher later in life with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  However, with β = 0.7, the 
model performs substantially better in tracking credit card balances, the share of wealth held in 
liquid form, the marginal propensity to consume out of anticipated income, and the discontinuity 
in consumption at retirement.  
  Laibson et. al. [2004] develop and estimate a similar model with stochastic labor income, 
liquidity constraints, child and adult dependents, liquid and illiquid assets, and revolving credit. 
They use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate many of the parameters of the model 
based  on  data  from  the  Survey  of  Consumer  Finances.  They  formally  reject  the  standard 
exponential model in favor of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  According to their estimates, the 
short-run annualized discount rate is 40%, while the long-run annualized discount rate is only 4%.  
Their rejection of exponential discounting is driven by the observation that high levels of credit 
card borrowing coexist with significant wealth accumulation.  Paserman (2002) uses labor market 
data on unemployment durations and market wages to estimate a related model. He finds a long-
run discount rate of 0.1% and a short-term discount rate of 10-60%. Fang and Silverman (2002) 
conduct a similar exercise using welfare participation data.  
  These  studies  exemplify  the  approach  to  empirical  Behavioral  Public  Economics 
described  in  section  2.D.    They  demonstrate  the  feasibility  of  this  approach,  and  provide 
important  evidence  in  support  of  a  behavioral  approach  to  savings  policy.    However,  much 
additional empirical work is required to establish the stability, robustness, and scope of these 
findings.  
  It  is  important  to  emphasize  that,  while  this  collection  of  empirical  papers  provides 
evidence against the standard model, they do not allow one to conclude that the (β,δ) model 
outperforms other behavioral alternatives, such as those discussed in the ensuing sections.  The 
patterns in the data that produce estimates of β less than unity could result from other processes 
that generate excessive consumption.  To our knowledge, no one has yet undertaken empirical 
comparisons of alternative behavioral models. 
  The policy implications of the (β,δ)-model are dramatically different from those of the 
standard model.  Since many individuals choose sub-optimally low levels of saving, there may be 
welfare improving policy interventions even in the absence of capital market failures.  First, 
mandatory savings programs may be welfare-enhancing, provided they are large enough to crowd 
out private savings (in the form of liquid assets) at some point during the life cycle (Imrohoroglu 
et. al. [2003]). See Feldstein (1985) for a characterization the optimal level of social security 
benefits in an overlapping generations economy with two-period lifetimes and heterogenous self-  28 
control problems, and Diamond and Koszegi [2003] for an analysis of social security with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and endogenous retirement.
9 Third, as long as the population includes 
some  individuals  with  self-control  problems,  and  assuming  the  social  welfare  function  is 
continuous and concave, a small subsidy for saving financed with lump-sum taxes is welfare 
improving.  Intuitively, since individuals with self-control problems save too little, the subsidy 
produces a first-order improvement in their well-being, and has only a second-order effect on the 
welfare of those without self-control problems. For a discussion of optimal taxation in the (β,δ)-
model,  see  O’Donoghue  and  Rabin  [2005]  and    Krusell,  Kuruscu,  and  Smith  [2000,2002]. 
Finally,  introducing  restrictions  on  the  availability  of  credit,  for  example  by  regulating  the 
distribution of revolving credit-lines and mandating credit ceilings, can significantly enhance the 
well-being of those with self-control problems. 
 
  3.F. Models of savings with cue-triggered mistakes 
  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2005b]  propose  an  alternative  model  of  savings  in  which 
individuals make stochastic mistakes. As in the standard model, true preferences correspond to an 
additively separable function with exponential discounting. The individual makes decisions in 
two distinct modes. With probability pt, decision processes function properly, and he optimizes as 
in the standard model. With probability 1- pt, decision processes are in faulty (implicitly because 
an environmental cue triggers a lapse of self-control), and he consumers excessively.  He can 
influence  the  probability  of  encountering  cues  that  trigger  the  faulty  decision  mode  through 
choices of activities (for example, whether to shop at expensive stores).  
  In  the  functional  mode,  the  decision-maker  is  sophisticated  about  his  self-control 
problem: he selects the optimal level of current consumption recognizing the probabilities and 
consequences of entering the faulty mode in the future, as well as the manner in which his actions 
affect the distribution of future decision modes. In the faulty mode, he “binges.” This response is 
mechanical, reflecting simple impulses.  In the simplest versions of the model, the size of the 
binge is proportional either to intended consumption (e.g., because he has chosen to shop in an 
expensive  store),  or  to  remaining  lifetime  resources  (where  the  factor  of  proportionality  is 
sufficiently large to ensure that the binge exceeds intended consumption).  In either case, the size 
of the binge is constrained by his available liquid resources.  
  The model has two straightforward implications.  First, pre-commitment technologies are 
valuable because they can reduce size of a mistake when the faulty mode is triggered. Second, the 
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consumer can actively manage his self-control problem, for example by choosing activities that 
reduce the likelihood of encountering cues that trigger binges.  If the size of the binge is related to 
intended consumption, he can also reduce the size of mistakes, when they occur, by planning to 
consume less (e.g., lapses are less costly if he shops at less expensive stores). 
  Other implications of the model are less immediate.  While an increase in the probability 
or size of a binge always reduces welfare, it can either increase or decrease the level of saving 
(depending on parameter values).  Additional saving becomes more attractive because it allows 
the individual to self-insure against future mistakes.  However, it also becomes less attractive 
because it leads to greater waste.  The net effect on savings depends on the balance of these two 
forces.  
  The model also predicts the existence of low-asset traps.  For an individual with few 
assets, the size of a binge is constrained by liquid resources.  If he saves an additional dollar and 
then experiences a binge, the entire dollar is wasted.  For an individual with substantial wealth, 
the size of a binge is ordinarily not constrained by liquid resources.  If he saves an additional 
dollar and then experiences a binge, only a fraction of the dollar is wasted.  Consequently, saving 
is relatively less attractive when wealth is low. 
  With respect to durable consumption goods, the implications of this model potentially 
differ from those of the (β,δ)-framework.  The (β,δ)-model envisions present-bias with respect to 
consumption flows.  Consequently, it cannot explain excessive consumption of durable goods 
with long lives, for which the bulk of consumption occurs in the future.  In contrast, since an 
individual may act impulsively with respect to both present and future consumption, a model with 
stochastic cue-conditioned decision modes can easily generate excessive consumption of durable 
goods.    Accordingly,  this  model  potentially  justifies  cooling-off  periods  for  automobile 
purchases, whereas the (β,δ)-model does not. 
  Many of the policy implications of this model parallel those (β,δ)-framework. Even in the 
absence  of  capital  market  imperfections,  government  intervention  is  potentially  welfare-
improving.  The introduction of mandatory savings can enhance the well-being of those with self-
control problems, but only if the program is large enough to crowd out all liquid assets at some 
point during the life-cycle, in some state of nature. Regulations that restrict the availability of 
credit are also potentially beneficial. 
  There  are,  however,  important  differences  between  the  two  models.  Perhaps  most 
notably, whereas optimal policy in the (β,δ)-model entails subsidized savings, in this model either 
taxation or subsidization of saving may be optimal.  To understand why, note that there are two   30 
key differences between the models.  First, in the (β,δ)-model consumers always make present-
biased mistakes, while in this model mistakes are stochastic.  This means that social insurance 
considerations come into play.  To partially insure the consumer against bad realizations, the 
government should give him money when random events reduce his wealth, and take money 
away when random events increase his wealth.  In this context, the random event that potentially 
reduces his wealth is a cue-triggered binge.  A capital income tax (coupled with a lump-sum 
subsidy) supplements the individual’s wealth when he experiences a binge (because his saving is 
low), and reduces his wealth when he does not binge (because his saving is high).  Second, in the 
(β,δ)-model,  the  decision  maker  responds  to  future  economic  incentives  even  while  making 
mistakes, whereas this model assumes that errors result from a mechanical and largely inflexible 
impulses.    Accordingly,  taxation  directly  reduces  the  magnitude  decision  errors  in  the  (β,δ) 
framework, but has a limited effect on binges in this model.
 10 
   In models with cue-triggered binges, there is also a natural role for cognitive policies 
such as the regulation of advertising and marketing.  If advertising increases the likelihood and 
size  of  mistakes  by  proliferating  cues,  restrictions  on  advertisements  are  potentially  welfare-
improving, particularly if their information content is small.  However, for the reasons discussed 
above, the impact of such restrictions on the level of saving is ambiguous.  One could incorporate 
the same forces in the (β,δ)-model by assuming that advertising  reduces the value of β.  In 
contrast to the current model, this would necessarily reduce saving (provided the consumer’s 
horizon is finite). 
  One can also rationalize framing effects in this model by assuming that the probability of 
entering the faulty mode depends on cues embedded in the presentation of a decision problem.  It 
may  then  be  possible  to  design  savings  plans  that  increase  thrift  without  providing  new 
information or changing budget constraints, as claimed by Thaler and Shefrin [2004]. 
  The  model  of  savings  described  in  this  section  is  closely  related  to  the  process-
malfunction theory of addiction discussed below in section 4.E.  Since we advocate the use of 
reduced form models of decision making justified by evidence on underlying psychological and 
neural  processes,  we  end  this  section  with  a  disclaimer.    In  the  context  of  addiction,  the 
hypothesis that people make cue-triggered mistakes has a solid foundation in neuroscience.  In 
the context of saving, the foundations are less solid.  As emphasized in section 4.D, it is known 
that self-control plays a critical role in determining saving, and a significant body of evidence 
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suggests that cues influence the ability to impose self-control.  However, it is difficult to draw a 
clear  distinction  between  a  lapse  of  self-control  and,  say,  a  temporary  (and  possibly  cue-
triggered) state of impatience.  Our understanding of the neurobiology of self-control, and how it 
relates to intertemporal choice, is still preliminary.     
 
  3.G. Models of savings with non-standard preferences 
  Gul and Psendorfer [2004a,b] propose an alternative model to account for the role of self-
control in determining saving.  In contrast to the approaches discussed in the preceding sections, 
they adhere to the principle of revealed preference, thereby excluding the possibility that lapses of 
self-control involve mistakes.  According to their model, the consumer acts as if he maximizes an 
intertemporal utility function of the following form:  




  u(ct,Bt), 
where Bt denotes the budget set in period t.  The inclusion of Bt as an argument of u differentiates 
this  framework  from  the  standard  approach.    The  budget  constraint  enters  preferences  in  a 
specific way: 
  u(ct,Bt) = v(ct) [
c Bt
max (c)  (ct)],  
where v(.), the flow of utility of consumption, and τ(.), the level of temptation associated with a 
given option, are increasing concave functions satisfying the usual properties. The second term 
(in brackets) reflects the unpleasant sensation of temptation experienced by the consumer when 
he fails to select the most tempting alternative in his budget set. 
  To understand how the model works, it is useful to consider a simple consumption-saving 
problem with two periods, no discounting, and zero interest. Let R denote the amount of resources 
available to the individual in period 1, and let s=R-c1 denote the level of saving.  The period 2 
value function is given by 
  V2(s) = v(s) [
c [0,s] max (c)  (s)]= v(s). 
That is, since the individual spends all his resources in the second period, he does not experience 
unpleasant temptation.  Using this expression, we can write lifetime utility as a function of first-
period saving:    
  V1(s) = v(R   s) [
t [0,R] max (R   t)  (R   s)]+V2(s). 
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In the absence of temptation, the individual would simply maximize  v(R   s)+ v(s).  At an 
interior solution, this requires  v'(R   s) = v'(s).  The introduction of temptation increases the 
cost of savings by   '(R   s), which causes saving to fall.   
  Several properties of the model are worth highlighting. First, the presence of temptation 
can decrease well-being even if does not affect behavior.  In this sense, self-control is costly. 
Second, the individual is always (weakly) better off when a planner removes all discretion and 
forces him to consume the allocation that would be optimal in the absence of temptation. Third, 
the individual experiences temptation with respect to current choices, but not with respect to 
future choices.  (He is not, for example, tempted to purchase a sports car delivered with some 
lag.)  As a result, in the absence of uncertainty, an individual who has the ability to lock in 
choices one period in advance can achieve the first-best (except in the first period). Fourth, as in 
the standard model, choices are dynamically consistent.  
   Gul and Psendorfer’s model can be interpreted as a reduced form representation of the 
process that generates the costs associated with temptation and the exercise of self-control. A 
closely  related  model,  pioneered  by  Thaler  and  Shefrin  [1981]  and  recently  revisited  by 
Fudenberg and Levine [2005], makes the sources of these costs more explicit.  Preferences are 
given by an intertemporal utility function of the form 




  u(ct,at), 
where at measures the intensity with which the individual deploys self-control in period t.  The 
consumer chooses at at the outset of each period with the object of maximizing intertemporal 
utility; he then chooses ct myopically, based on immediate benefits.  The imposition of self-
control is costly in the sense that  u /  a < 0 , but it leads to lower consumption. 
  As  shown  by  Benabou  and  Pycia  [2002],  O’Donoghue  and  Loewenstein  [2004],  and 
Fudenberg and Levine [2005], this framework is equivalent over consumption-saving choices to 
Gul and Pesendorfer’s theory of temptation. See also Loewenstein-O’Donoghue [2004] for an 
insightful discussion of the relationship between this class of models and the (β,δ)-framework. 
  Gul and Psendorfer [2004a,b] emphasize that their approach is conceptually consistent 
with the method of revealed preference.  Supposedly, this eliminates the need for non-choice 
data, and prevents the policy analyst from imposing his or her own judgments when evaluating 
welfare.  We disagree.  Practical implementation of the revealed preference methodology requires 
the analyst to make assumptions about the data generating process (e.g. about functional forms, or 
similarities across individuals).  There are always untested assumptions, which the analyst selects   33 
based on other information, instinct, introspection, or fuzzy notions of “reasonableness.”  We 
believe it is fair to say that these assumptions are not chosen exclusively on the basis of choice 
data.  Moreover, as all veterans of empirical policy debates are aware, the analyst’s judgments 
about  untested  assumptions  translate  directly  into  judgments  about  welfare.    There  are  also 
theoretical  considerations,  which  we  discuss  at  length  in  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2005b].  
Assuming one restricts attention to data on choices over allocations and constraint sets, both the 
standard theory and Gul and Pesendorfer’s model are observationally equivalent to other models 
with different welfare implications.  Hence, the analyst’s judgment, expressed through axioms 
and assumptions, is unavoidable. 
  What are the novel policy implications of the temptation model? First, mandatory savings 
programs can improve welfare even if they do not increase savings. This follows from the fact 
that any limit on consumption reduces temptation.  In contrast to models with (β,δ) discounting 
and cue-triggered mistakes, a small program of mandatory saving can enhance welfare even if 
people still retain positive liquid assets in all time periods and states of nature.  Second, unlike 
models with (β,δ) discounting and cue-triggered mistakes, there is no role for corrective taxation.  
See Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2001) for further results and discussion. 
 
  3.H. Discussion 
  Economists  have  only  recently  begun  to  study  saving  using  tools  from  behavioral 
economics. Even so, the models described in this section have already provided valuable insights. 
We conclude this section with a brief description of some important open questions.  
  The  models described in this survey provide an explanation for some of the patterns 
described in sections 2.C and 2.D, including time inconsistency, self-reported mistakes, and some 
types of inefficient financial choices. However, it is not clear that they can adequately account for 
other  patterns,  such  as  the  discontinuity  of  consumption  near  retirement,  the  role  of  default 
options,  the  failure  to  plan,  and  the  use  of  rough  rules  of  thumb.    None  provides  a  fully 
satisfactory explanation for the success of the Saving for Tomorrow Savings Plan
TM designed by 
Thaler  and  Shefrin  [2004],  which  relies  on  framing  effects  instead  of  changes  in  budget 
constraints. Nor do they incorporate limitations on financial skills.  In focusing on self-control 
problems, they ignore issues associated with the complexity of financial decision-making. 
  Likewise, the theoretical work described in the previous sections has formalized only a 
few of the behavioral channels through which public policy could affect choices and welfare.  It   34 
is important to study other behavioral  mechanisms  with the same level of rigor.   Interesting 
possibilities include the following. 
1. The role of financial professionals.  Many people rely on advice from financial 
professionals.  One can therefore potentially learn about behavior by studying the methods 
used  to  generate  this  advice  (see  e.g.  Bernheim  et.  al.  [2002]).    For  example,  the  most 
common  retirement  planning  technique involves  setting some  fixed  target  for  retirement 
(usually  derived  from  an  arbitrary  earnings  replacement  rate)  and  computing  the  annual 
inflation-adjusted  contribution  to  savings  sufficient  to  achieve  this  target  (see  Doyle  and 
Johnson [1991]).  This generates a negative interest elasticity of saving because higher rates 
of return make it easier to accumulate the resources required to reach the target. 
2.  Social  influences.    When  saving  incentives  are  in  place,  boundedly  rational 
individuals may be more likely to learn that others regard the benefits of saving as important.  
For  example,  the  availability  of  a  401(k)  in  an  employment  setting  may  stimulate 
conversations  about  contributions  and  investments,  and  thereby  produce  “peer  group” 
influences involving both demonstration and competition (see, e.g., Duflo and Saez [2002, 
2003]).  The very existence of a pro-saving policy may indicate that “authorities” perceive 
the  need  for  greater  thrift,  or  endorse  a  particular  level  of  saving  (e.g.,  the  contribution 
limit).  
  3.  Keeping  score.    By  segmenting  retirement  saving  from  other  forms  of  saving, 
certain kinds of tax-favored accounts may make it easier to monitor progress towards long-
term  objectives.    Information  on  total  accumulated  balances  is  usually  provided 
automatically,  or  is  readily  available.    This  gives  individuals  a  convenient  yardstick  for 
measuring the adequacy or inadequacy of their thrift.  This may have the effect of making 
the costs of short-sightedness more explicit.  It could also help people formulate goals and 
simple behavioral rules.  According to  Thaler and Shefrin (1981),  "[s]imply keeping track 
seems to act as a tax on any behavior which the planner views as deviant." 
4.  Intrinsic  motivation.    Scitovsky  [1976]  has  raised  the  possibility  that  some 
individuals  may  view  saving  as  a  virtuous  activity  in  and  of  itself,  without  any  explicit 
contemplation  of  future consequences (see  also  Katona  [1975]).   Pro-saving policies  may 
promote this outlook by reinforcing the notion that, as something worthy of encouragement, 
saving is intrinsically rewarding and immediately gratifying. 
  5. Intrinsic gratification from tax avoidance.  We have noted that people are more 
likely to contribute to IRAs if they owe money at the end of the tax year.  This suggests that 
immediate  tax  avoidance  is  intrinsically  gratifying.    If  so,  “front-loaded”  plans,  wherein 
contributions  are  deductible  and  withdrawals  are  fully  taxable,  may  be  more  effective  in   35 
stimulating saving  than  “back-loaded”  plans, wherein  contributions  are  not  deductible  and 
withdrawals of principal are not taxable.  
  6. Mental accounting.  Shefrin and Thaler [1988] and Lowenstein and Prelec [1998] 
argue that people exercise self-control by separating resources into “mental accounts,” each 
associated  with  a  different  objective.    IRAs  and  401(k)s  may  reinforce  the  discipline  of 
mental  accounting  by  earmarking  certain  resources  for  retirement,  particularly  in  the 
presence of penalties for early withdrawal. 
  7. Education  and  promotion.  The  existence  of  tax-deferred savings accounts  may 
stimulate promotional activities and advertisements by financial services firms.  Policies that 
favor  the  development  of  employee-directed  pensions  (like  401(k)s)  may  encourage 
employers to provide retirement education.  While advertising and education appear to affect 
financial decisions, the precise mechanisms are poorly understood. 
These  types  of  considerations  potentially  have important  implications  for  critical 
policy questions, such as the choice between broad-based policies for promoting saving (e.g., 
consumption  taxation)  and  more  targeted  strategies  (e.g.,  IRAs).    From  a  behavioral 
perspective, narrow measures can focus attention on a single issue (such as the adequacy of 
saving  for  retirement),  expose  individuals  to  information  concerning  the  importance  of 
saving, provide a natural context for the development and enforcement of private rules, and 
promote the growth of pro-saving institutions.  Contribution limits may actually stimulate 
saving  if  they  validate  specific  targets,  provide  natural  focal  points  for  the  formation  of 
private rules, or make it easier to monitor compliance with these rules.   
4. Addiction   
 
Although more than four million chemical compounds have been catalogued to date, only 
a few score are classified as addictive by clinical consensus (Gardner and David (1999)).  These 
include  alcohol,  barbiturates,  amphetamines,  cocaine,  caffeine  and  related  methylxanthine 
stimulants,  cannabis,  hallucinogens,  nicotine,  opioids,  dissociative  anesthetics,  and  volatile 
solvents.  There is also some debate as to whether other substances, such as fats and sugars, or 
activities, such as shopping, shoplifting, sex, television viewing, and internet use, are clinically 
addictive.    These  substances  and  activities  pose  challenges  both  for  public  policy,  and  for 
standard economic analysis. 
This section reviews the distinctive behavioral patterns associated with the consumption 
of  addictive  substances,  describes  the  neuroscientific  foundations  of  addiction,  summarizes 
several competing economic models, and reviews their policy implications.   36 
 
  4.A. The policy issues 
The  consumption  of  addictive  substances  raises  important  social  issues  affecting 
members of all socioeconomic strata, and citizens of virtually every nation. Readily available 
statistics for the United States illustrate the scope of the phenomenon.
11 Estimates for 1999 place 
total  expenditures  on  tobacco  products,  alcoholic  beverages,  cocaine,  heroin,  marijuana,  and 
methamphetamines at more than $150 billion.  During a single month in 1999, more than 57 
million individuals smoked at least one cigarette, more than 41 million engaged in binge drinking 
(involving five or more drinks on one occasion), and roughly 12 million used marijuana.  In 1998, 
slightly more than 5 million Americans qualified as "hard-core" chronic drug users.  Roughly 4.6 
million persons in the workforce met the criterion for a diagnosis of drug dependence and 24.5 
million had a history of clinical alcohol dependence.  In 1998, additional social costs resulting 
from health care expenditures, loss of life, impaired productivity, motor vehicle accidents, crime, 
law enforcement, and welfare totaled $185 billion for alcohol and $143 billion for other addictive 
substances.  Smoking  killed  roughly  418,000  people  in  1990,  alcohol  accounted  for  107,400 
deaths in 1992, and drug use resulted in 19,277 deaths during 1998.  Alcohol abuse contributed to 
25 to 30 percent of violent crimes. 
Even within jurisdictions, public policy toward various addictive substances is far from 
uniform, despite the commonalities suggested by their shared clinical classification.   Policies 
range  from  laissez  faire  to  taxation,  subsidization  (e.g.  of  rehabilitation  programs),  regulated 
dispensation,  criminalization,  product  liability,  and  public  health  campaigns.  Each  alternative 
policy approach has passionate advocates and detractors.   
Despite sharp disagreements about the ideal treatment of addictive substances, there is 
reasonably widespread agreement that most existing policies work poorly.  The U.S. “War on 
Drugs”  is,  for  example,  often  labeled  a  “failed  policy.”    Use  of  banned  substances  remains 
widespread,  and  the  resulting  health  costs  are  high.    Prohibitions  on  certain  substances,  like 
marijuana, lack credibility among younger Americans, who fail to see why alcohol is singled out 
as socially acceptable.  While the incidence of criminal activity among drug addicts is relatively 
high,  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  drug  related-crime  is,  to  a  significant  extent,  a 
consequence of current policy, rather than a justification for it.  Criminalization promotes black 
                                                 
11 The statistics in this paragraph were obtained from the following sources: Office of National Drug Control Policy 
[2001a,b], U.S. Census Bureau [2001], National Institute on Drug Abuse [1998], National Institute on Alcohol Abuse 
and Alcoholism [2001], and Center for Disease Control [1993].  There is, of course, disagreement as to many of the 
reported figures.   37 
markets, fosters organized crime, enriches criminals, and contributes to a culture of violence.  As 
a result, more than 625,000 citizens  were incarcerated for drug-related offenses curing 1999.  
These  people  were  disproportionately  poor,  black,  and  among  society's  most  economically 
vulnerable members. 
While  existing  policies  have  serious  drawbacks,  alternatives  are  also  potentially 
problematic.  For example, the high incidence of alcohol abuse and smoking, along with the 
attendant social costs, at a minimum raise serious concerns about the potential consequences of 
across-the-board legalization.  The apparent intractability of social problems related to addiction 
underscores the importance of creatively and openly rethinking policy strategies.   
  4.B. The neoclassical perspective on addiction 
  Prior  to  the  1990s,  neurological  theories  of  addiction  were  based  on  the  “pleasure 
principle”.  It was widely believed that people start using drugs to achieve a pleasurable “high,” 
and continue using them despite a deterioration of the high (a phenomenon known as “tolerance”) 
to avoid unpleasant feelings associated with cravings and withdrawal.  These hedonic properties 
are easily incorporated into standard models of consumer choice.  Early work in this tradition 
includes papers by Stigler and Becker [1977], Iannacone [1986], and Becker and Murphy [1988].  
The last of these is widely viewed as the definitive articulation of the neoclassical perspective on 
addictive behavior, also known as the theory of “rational addiction.” 
  In Becker and Murphy’s model, the individual’s well-being depends on consumption of 
an addictive good, consumption of a non-addictive good, and a state variable summarizing past 
consumption of the addictive good.  This addictive state rises with use of the substance and falls 
with abstinence.  To model tolerance, one assumes that utility declines as the addictive state rises.  
To model the effects of cravings and the pain of withdrawal on the inclination to use a substance, 
one assumes that the marginal utility of the addictive good rises with the addictive state.  This 
assumption  is  necessary  (but  not  sufficient)  to  generate  a  property  known  as  “adjacent 
complementarity,” which means that greater current consumption leads to greater consumption in 
the future.  According to Becker and Murphy, this is the distinguishing feature of an addictive 
substance. 
  Becker and Murphy’s model generates a variety of interesting positive results regarding 
the use of addictive substances.   For example,  with appropriate parameterizations, the  model 
generates behavior that is consistent with aspects of bingeing cycles and abrupt withdrawals.  It 
distinguishes  between  conditions  that  lead  to  certain  behaviors  which  they  associate  with 
addiction, and conditions that do not.  It also predicts that an anticipated future increase in the   38 
price of an  addictive substance leads to an immediate decrease in drug use  (see  Gruber and 
Koszegi [2001] and Chaloupka and Warner [2001] for a review of supporting evidence). 
From  a  normative  perspective,  the  theory  of  rational  addiction  makes  no  distinction 
between  addictive  substances  and  other  goods.    Accordingly,  the  standard  welfare  theorems 
apply.    It  follows  that  government  intervention  is  justified  only  if  markets  for  addictive 
substances function imperfectly.  There are two main concerns in this regard.  First, if people are 
either poorly informed or misinformed about the effects of addictive substances, they may make 
poor decisions.  As long as the government can provide relevant information more effectively and 
efficiently  than  private  markets,  educational  policies  (e.g.,  public  health  campaigns)  are 
potentially  beneficial.  Second,  the  consumption  of  addictive  substances  may  generate 
externalities.  For example, driving under the influence leads to accidents, addicts commit crimes 
to support their habits, and addiction can be devastating to family members.  The standard policy 
prescription  for  externalities  involves  a  Pigouvian  tax  per-unit  of  the  substance  equal  to  the 
marginal external damage that it imposes on others.  
  Since the publication of Becker and Murphy’s paper, others have extended the theory of 
rational addiction in a variety of ways, mainly to account for other observed features of addictive 
behavior.    For  example,  in  Orphanides  and  Zervos  [1995],  different  people  have  different 
susceptibilities to addiction, which they discover through experimentation.  The paper shows that 
a  highly  susceptible  individual  can  control  his  addictive  tendencies  if  he  discovers  his 
susceptibility quickly, but not if he discovers it slowly.  The authors briefly discuss a few policy 
implications.  Clearly, consumers benefit from accurate information concerning the distribution 
of susceptibilities.  Moreover, since people are uncertain about their addictive susceptibilities, 
imperfections in private markets for rehabilitation insurance can leave them with residual risk, 
which  potentially  creates  a  role  for  government  as  a  provider  of  social  insurance.  Other 
contributions include (but are not limited to) Dockner and Feichtinger [1993], who show how the 
theory of rational addiction can account for cyclical consumption patterns, and Orphanides and 
Zervos [1998], who introduce impulsiveness by allowing the consumer’s discount rate to depend 
(in a time-consistent way) on use.   
  4.C. Some problematic empirical observations 
In some ways, consumption patterns for addictive substances are no different than for 
other goods.  A number of studies have shown that aggregate drug use responds both to prices 
and to information about the effects of addictive substances.  For example, an aggressive U.S. 
public  health  campaign  is  widely  credited  with  reductions  in  smoking  rates.  There  is  also   39 
evidence  that  users  engage  in  sophisticated  forward-looking  deliberation,  reducing  current 
consumption  in  response  to  anticipated  price  increases.
12    What,  then,  makes  addiction  a 
distinctive phenomenon?  Bernheim and Rangel [2004] list five important behavioral patterns 
distilled  from  the  extensive  body  of  research  on  addiction  in  neuroscience,  psychology,  and 
clinical practice.   
1.  Unsuccessful  attempts  to  quit.    Addicts  often  express  a  desire  to  stop  using  a 
substance  permanently  and  unconditionally  but  are  unable  to  follow  through.    Short-term 
abstention is common while long-term recidivism rates are high. For example, during 2000, 70 
percent of current smokers expressed a desire to quit completely and 41 percent stopped smoking 
for at least one day in an attempt to quit, but only 4.7 percent successfully abstained for more than 
three months.
13  This pattern is particularly striking because regular users initially experience 
painful withdrawal symptoms when they first attempt to quit, and these symptoms decline over 
time with successful abstention.  Thus, recidivism often occurs after users have borne the most 
significant costs of quitting, sometimes following years of determined abstention. 
2.  Cue-triggered  recidivism.  Recidivism  rates  are  especially  high  when  addicts  are 
exposed to cues related to past drug consumption. Long-term usage is considerably lower among 
those who experience significant changes of environment.
14  Treatment programs often advise 
recovering addicts to move to new locations and to avoid the places where previous consumption 
took place. Stress and “priming” (exposure to a small taste of the substance) have also been 
shown to trigger recidivism.
15 
3. Self-described mistakes.  Addicts often describe past use as a mistake in a very strong 
sense: they think that they would have been better off in the past as well as the present had they 
acted differently.  They recognize that they are likely to make similar errors in the future, and that 
this will undermine their desire to abstain.  When they succumb to cravings, they sometimes 
characterize choices as mistakes even while in the act of consumption. It is instructive that the 
twelve-step program of Alcoholic Anonymous begins: "We admit we are powerless over alcohol 
- that our lives have become unmanageable." 
    As an example, Goldstein [2001,p.249] describes an addict who had been 
                                                 
12 See Chaloupka and Warner [2001], MacCoun and Reuter [2001], and Gruber and Koszegi [2001] for a review of the 
evidence. 
13 See Trosclair et. al. [2002], Goldstein [2001], Hser, Anglin, and Powers [1993], Harris [1993], and O'Brien [1997]. 
14 See Goldstein [2001], Goldstein and Kalant [1990], O'Brien [1976,1997], and Hser et. al. [1993,2001]. Robins 
[1974] and Robins et.al. [1974] found that Vietnam veterans who were addicted to heroin and/or opium at the end of 
the war experienced much lower relapse rates than other young male addicts during the same period.  A plausible 
explanation is that veterans encountered fewer environmental triggers (familiar circumstances associated with drug use) 
upon returning to the U.S. 
15 See Goldstein [2001] and Robinson and Berridge [2003].   40 
"...suddenly overwhelmed by an irresistible craving, and he had rushed out of his house 
to find some heroin. ... it was as though he were driven by some external force he was 
powerless to resist, even though he knew while it was happening that it was a disastrous 
course of action for him" (italics added). 
 
4. Self-control through precommitment. Recovering users often manage their tendency 
to make mistakes by voluntarily removing or degrading future options.  They voluntarily admit 
themselves  into  "lock-up"  rehabilitation  facilities,  often  not  to  avoid  cravings,  but  precisely 
because they expect to experience cravings and wish to control their actions.  They also consume 
medications that either generate unpleasant side effects, or reduce pleasurable sensations, if the 
substance  is  subsequently  consumed.
16    Severe  addicts  sometimes  enlist  others to  assist  with 
physical confinement to assure abstinence through the withdrawal process. 
5. Self-control through behavioral and cognitive therapy.  Recovering addicts attempt to 
minimize  the  probability  of  relapse  through  behavioral  and  cognitive  therapies.    Successful 
behavioral therapies teach cue-avoidance, often by encouraging the adoption of new life-styles 
and the development of new interests.  Successful cognitive therapies teach cue-management, 
which  entails  refocusing  attention  on  alternative  consequences  and  objectives,  often  with  the 
assistance of a mentor or trusted friend or through a meditative activity such as prayer.  Notably, 
these therapeutic strategies affect addict's choices without providing new information.
17 
  The clinical definition of addiction makes reference to some of these patterns.  Substance 
addiction is said to occur when, after significant exposure, users find themselves engaging in 
compulsive, repeated, and unwanted use despite clearly harmful consequences, and often despite 
a  strong  desire  to  quit  unconditionally  (see  e.g.  the  American  Psychological  Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, known as DSM-IV). 
From the perspective of traditional economic analysis, each of the patterns listed above is 
at least somewhat puzzling.    The rational consumers of economic textbooks have no trouble 
following  through  on  plans,  and  therefore  should  manifest  neither  of  the  first  two  patterns.  
Contrary to the third pattern, rational consumers always choose what they want, so, armed with 
good  information,  they  can't  make  systematic  mistakes.    The  notion  that  someone  might  be 
powerless over a consumption good is an anethema to a neoclassical economist.  The standard 
                                                 
16 Disulfiram interferes with the liver's ability to metabolize alcohol; as a result, ingestion of alcohol produces a highly 
unpleasant physical reaction for a period of time. Methadone, an agonist, activates the same opioid receptors as heroin, 
and thus produces a mild high, but has a slow-onset and a long-lasting effect, and it reduces the high produced by 
heroin. Naltrexone, an antagonist, blocks specific brain receptors, and thereby diminishes the high produced by opioids. 
All of these treatments reduce the frequency of relapse. See O'Brien [1997] and Goldstein [2001]. 
17 Goldstein [2001] reports that there is a shared impression among the professional community that 12-step programs 
such as AA (p. 149) "are effective for many (if not most) alcohol addicts." However, given the nature of these 
programs, objective performance tests are not available. The AA treatment philosophy is based on "keeping it simple 
by putting the focus on not drinking, on attending meetings, and on reaching out to other alcoholics."   41 
theory  of  consumer  behavior  embraces  the  principle  that  expanding  or  improving  the  set  of 
available alternatives necessarily makes an individual better off, so precommitments can only be 
counterproductive, contrary to the fourth pattern.  Finally, since in the standard model individuals 
never make mistakes, there is no role for expenditures on self-control. 
Creative extensions of the basic model may provide rationalizations for some of these 
patterns without overturning the basic paradigm.  For example, Laibson [2001] has proposed a 
variant  of  the  Becker-Murphy  framework  in  which  preferences  become  state-contingent  with 
experience, and which can in principle account for cue management and avoidance.  Even so, the 
five patterns described above collectively pose a serious challenge to neoclassical perspective, 
and provide motivation for economists to think “outside the box.” 
  4.D. Recent insights from the neuroscience of addiction 
Over the last 10 years, a new scientific consensus has begun to emerge concerning the 
nature of addiction. It now appears that addiction does not result primarily from the pleasurable 
effects of substances on the hedonic system.  Instead, the new view of addiction holds that certain 
substances interfere with the proper operation of a neural system that plays an important role in 
learning.  This is not to say that pleasure is unimportant.  However, the key feature of addiction 
appears to be the fact that addictive substances cause a specific learning process to malfunction.   
  Figure 1 shows, at a high level of abstraction, how the brain normally makes decisions 
about standard consumption goods. Our senses provide us with information about environmental 
conditions. We process this information, along with information about our internal states -- things 
like hunger, fatigue, and so forth -- and this results in a decision. The decision is followed by 
experience, including rewards. The experienced relationship between environmental conditions, 
decisions, and rewards induces learning, which normally improves the quality of future decisions.   42 
On  left-hand  side  of  this  diagram,  we've  broken  out  an  important  component  of  the 
decision-making system, which we've labeled the “basic forecasting mechanism.” This is a hard-
wired system for measuring correlations between conditions, decisions, and short-term rewards.  
It does not involve higher reasoning; in fact, it's present in lower life forms as well as humans. 
For  non-addictive  substances,  the  basic  forecasting  mechanism  learns  with  experience  to 
construct an accurate forecast of the subsequent hedonic experiences. 
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  the  brain  appears  to  have  a  variety  of  mechanisms  for 
forecasting the possible consequences of decisions. Some involve higher cognition (represented 
on the right hand side of the diagram); for example, we sometimes develop causal models of the 
world  and  reason  out  the  implications  of  our  actions.    Some  –  like  the  basic  forecasting 
mechanism – are more mechanical.   
Both types of forecasting mechanisms play a role in decision making. Sometimes we act 
based on the “gut reactions” generated by the basic forecasting mechanism.  Sometimes higher 
cognition overrides a gut reaction. This is how the brain is designed to work. Each process has its 
advantages and disadvantages. The basic forecasting mechanism is very fast, but it's inflexible 
and  unsophisticated.  Higher  cognition  is  flexible  and  sophisticated,  but  comparatively  slow. 
When we have to make decisions quickly, we rely on our gut reactions. When there's no time 
pressure, we take the time to think things through. A balance between these systems emerged 
through evolution as nature's compromise.  Consequently, the mere fact that we rely in some 
















Figure 1: Decision Processes for Standard Consumption Goods  43 
choices  are  irrational  or  dysfunctional.  For  non-addictive  substances,  these  mechanisms, 
operating in parallel, typically produce reasonable decisions. 
Figure 2 shows how addictive substances interfere with the proper operation of these 
decision-making processes.  In a nutshell, the problem with the addictive substances is that they 
act directly on the learning process underlying the basic forecasting mechanism, short-circuiting 
the neurological process by which this mechanism discovers correlations between environmental 
conditions,  decisions,  and  rewards.  As  a  result,  the  mechanism  massively  overstates  the 
correlation between drug use and actual experienced pleasure. Loosely speaking, drugs fool a 
subconscious, hard-wired brain process into anticipating an exaggerated level of pleasure. An 
addict  can  try  to  compensate  for  this  effect  by  exercising  cognitive  control,  but  he  can't 
consciously correct the malfunction of the basic forecasting mechanism.  
More specifically, the available neurological evidence supports four specific hypotheses 
that justify the new view of addictive substances (see Bernheim and Rangel [2004] for a more 
detailed discussion):   
First,  the  mesolimbic  dopamine  system  (MDS)  serves,  at  least  in  part,  as  a  basic 
forecasting mechanism which, with experience, learns to produce a response to situations and 
opportunities, the magnitude of which constitutes a forecast of near-term pleasure (see Schultz, 

















Figure 2: Decision Processes for Addictive Substances  44 
Second, MDS forecasting does not appear to directly produce or reflect the experience of 
pleasure.    Indeed,  the  human  brain  appears  to  contain  a  separate  hedonic  system  that  is 
responsible for producing sensations of “well-being.” (see Berridge [1996,1999], Berridge and 
Robinson [1998,2003], and Robinson and Berridge [1993,2000,2003]).   
Third, MDS-generated forecasts directly influence choices (see Berridge and Robinson 
[1998,2003] and Robinson and Berridge [1993,2000,2003])).  In an organism with a sufficiently 
developed  frontal  cortex,  higher  cognitive  mechanisms  can  override  impulses  resulting  from 
MDS forecasts, for example by identifying alternative courses of action or projecting the future 
consequences of choices.  The outcome depends on the intensity of the MDS forecast and on the 
ability of the frontal cortex to engage the necessary cognitive operations.  A strong MDS forecast 
can impair this ability by influencing attention to stimuli, cognitive focus, and memory.  Thus, a 
more attractive MDS-generated forecast makes cognitive override less likely.  
We emphasize that the basic forecasting mechanism and higher cognitive processes are 
not two different sets of “preferences” or “selves” competing for control of decisions. Hedonic 
experiences  are  generated  separately,  and  an  individual  maximizes  the  quality  of  these 
experiences by appropriately deploying both forecasting processes to anticipate outcomes.  
Fourth, addictive substances act directly on the basic forecasting mechanism, disrupting 
its  ability  to  construct  accurate  hedonic  forecasts  and  exaggerating  the  anticipated  hedonic 
benefits of consumption.  Although addictive substances differ considerably in their chemical and 
psychological properties, there is a large and growing consensus in neuroscience that they share 
an  ability  to  activate  the  firing  of  dopamine  into  the  nucleus  accumbens  with  much  greater 
intensity  and  persistence  than  other  substances.    They  do  this  either  by  activating  the  MDS 
directly, or by activating other networks that have a similar effect  (see Nestler and Malenka 
[2004],  Hyman  and  Malenka  [2001],  Nestler  [2001],  Wickelgreen  [1997],  and  Robinson  and 
Berridge [2003]).  For non-addictive substances, the MDS learns to assign a hedonic forecast that 
bears  some  normal  relation  to  the  subsequent  hedonic  experience.    For  addictive  substances, 
consumption activates dopamine firing directly, so the MDS learns to assign a hedonic forecast 
that is out of proportion to the subsequent hedonic experience.  This not only creates a strong (and 
misleading) impulse to seek and use the substance, but also undermines the potential for cognitive 
override. Cognitive override still occurs, but in a limited range of circumstances. 
The preceding discussion implies that, in some circumstances, drug use can literally be a 
mistake, in the sense that the brain is fooled into making a choice. It does not, however, imply 
that drug use is always a mistake. Even if the integrity of the basic forecasting mechanism is 
compromised, higher cognition can still either agree with it or override it.  In different people,   45 
brain chemistry appears to strike different balances between these mechanisms. This may explain 
why some people become addicts, while others use repeatedly without becoming addicted.  Use 
can be rational in some instances and irrational in others.  It is important to bear this point in mind 
when evaluating public policies alternatives. 
In emphasizing the effects of addictive substances on decision processes, we do not mean 
to discount the significance of their hedonic effects.  The typical user is initially drawn to an 
addictive  substance  because  it  produces  a  hedonic  “high.”    Over  time,  regular  use  leads  to 
hedonic and physical tolerance.  That is, the drug loses its ability to produce a high unless the user 
abstains for a while, and any attempt to discontinue the drug may have unpleasant side effects 
(withdrawal).  Cue-conditioned “cravings” may have hedonic implications as well as non-hedonic 
causes.  All of these effects are clearly important.  However, there is an emerging consensus in 
neuroscience and psychology that decision-process effects, rather than hedonic effects, provide 
the key to understanding addictive behavior (see Wise [1989], Robbins and Everitt [1996], Di 
Chiara [1999], Kelley [1999], Nestler and Malenka [2004], Hyman and Malenka [2001], Berridge 
and Robinson [2003], Robinson and Berridge [2000], and Redish [2004]). 
  4.E. Modeling addiction as a decision-process malfunction 
   Bernheim and Rangel [2004] present a theory of addiction that departs from the fourth 
assumption discussed in Section 2 (that choices are always aligned with preferences).  The theory 
is based on the following three main premises. 
First, use among addicts is sometimes a mistake, in the sense that actions diverge from 
preferences, and sometimes rational. 
Second, experience with an addictive substance sensitizes an individual to environmental 
cues that trigger mistaken usage.  
Third, addicts understand their susceptibility to cue-triggered mistakes and attempt to 
manage the process with some degree of sophistication. 
The first two premises are justified by the body of research described in section 3.D, 
which shows that, after repeated exposure to an addictive substance, the brain tends to make 
skewed hedonic forecasts upon encountering environmental cues that are associated with past 
substance use.  The third premise is justified by behavioral evidence indicating that users are 
often  surprisingly  sophisticated  and  forward  looking.    For  example,  they  reduce  current 
consumption in response to expected future price increases (Gruber and Koszegi [2001]).  Some 
also enter detox not because they intend to remain sober, but rather because they want to increase 
the intensity of the next high.   46 
  A summary of the model. The formal model in Bernheim and Rangel [2004] envisions 
an individual who makes a sequence of decisions regarding lifestyle, the use of an addictive 
substance, and the consumption of non-addictive substances.  It assumes that, at any point in 
time, the individual operates in one of two modes: a "cold" mode in which properly functioning 
decision-making  processes  lead  to  the  selection  of  his  most  preferred  alternative,  and  a 
dysfunctional "hot" mode in which decisions and preferences may diverge (because he responds 
to distorted MDS-generated forecasts).
18  The hot mode is transient, but always results in use of 
the  substance.    The  likelihood  of  entering  the  hot  mode  at  any  moment  depends  on  the 
individual's history of substance use, his chosen lifestyle (e.g., partying exposes the individual to 
more intense substance-related cues), and random events (e.g., the frequency and intensity of 
recently encountered environmental cues to which he has been sensitized through prior use). 
The history of use is summarized through the notion of an addictive state.  Use moves the 
individual to a higher addictive state, and abstention moves him to a lower addictive state.  An 
increase in the addictive state raises the likelihood of entering the hot mode at any moment (e.g., 
because  it  implies  increased  sensitivity  to  randomly  occurring  environment  cues).    Higher 
addictive  states  are  also  associated  with  lower  baseline  well-being  (e.g.,  due  to  deteriorating 
health), lower financial resources (due to decreased productivity, absenteeism, and out-of-pocket 
medical expenses), and possible a greater “boost” from consuming the addictive substance.   
By varying assumptions about the properties of the substance in question, the model can 
replicate a wide range of observed behaviors.  In particular, it can account for each of the patterns 
discussed in Section 3.C (see Bernheim and Rangel [2004] for details and Bernheim and Rangel 
[2005c] for simulations of the model).  
Policy  implications.    This  theory  admits  two  classes  of  rationales  for  government 
intervention. First, as in the theory of rational addiction, intervention may be justified to correct 
market failures involving addictive substances  – that is, the government can address externalities, 
misinformation, and ignorance. Second, policies may also affect the frequency and consequences 
of mistakes.  This consideration gives rise to a number of non-standard policy implications. 
1. Limitations of informational policy.  In practice, public education campaigns (such as 
the  U.S.  anti-smoking  and  anti-drug  initiatives)  have  achieved  mixed  results.    The  process-
malfunction  theory  of  addiction  highlights  a  fundamental  limitation  of  informational  policy: 
                                                 
18 Our analysis is related to work by Loewenstein [1996, 1999], who considers simple models in which an individual 
can operate either in a hot or cold decision-making mode. Notably, Loewenstein’s approach relaxes the assumption of 
fixed life-time preferences. He assumes that behavior in the hot mode reflects the application of a "false" utility 
function, rather than a breakdown of the processes by which a utility function is maximized. He also argues, contrary to 
our findings, that imperfect self-understanding is necessary for addiction-like behaviors.   47 
contrary to standard theory, one cannot assume that even a highly knowledgeable addict always 
makes informed choices.  Information about the consequences of substance abuse may affect 
initial experimentation with drugs, but cannot alter the neurological mechanisms through which 
addictive substances subvert deliberative decision making. 
2. Counterproductive disincentives.   Policies such as “sin taxes” and criminalization 
strive  to  discourage  use  by  making  substances  costly.    As  we’ve  noted,  this  is  potentially 
justifiable on the grounds that use generates negative externalities.  In the context of the theory 
described in this section, even higher taxes (whether implicit or explicit) might be justified if they 
reduce excessive use in “hot” decision states.  Unfortunately, it is likely that compulsive use of 
addictive substances is much less sensitive to costs and consequences than is deliberative use.  
Consequently, imposing costs in excess of external diseconomies is likely to distort cold-state 
choices  detrimentally,  without  significantly  reducing  problematic  hot-state  usage.    Indeed, 
policies that impose high costs on use may thwart social insurance objectives by exacerbating the 
consequences of uninsurable risks associated with the use of addictive substances.
19  Accordingly, 
the optimal rate of taxation for addictive substances may be significant lower than that implied by 
externalities (see Bernheim and Rangel [2005c] for simulation results).
20   
3.  Supply  disruption.    Standard  reasoning  suggests  that  taxation  is  preferable  to 
criminalization.  Both impose costs, but taxes generate revenues, while criminalization dissipates 
social resources.  In the context of the theory discussed in this section, criminalization offers an 
offsetting benefit: it disrupts supply, making it particularly difficult for users to obtain a banned 
substance on short notice.  The effect on use is likely to be larger in hot states, when people act 
impulsively, than in cold states, when people plan deliberatively.  This is exactly what one would 
hope to achieve, and precisely opposite the effect of a tax.   To put it somewhat differently, 
criminalization  may  help  some  addicts  impose  self-control,  without  (as  a  practical  matter) 
preventing deliberate use.  There is, however, an associated disadvantage: while in the hot state, 
addicts may engage in costly and potentially dangerous search. 
  4. Beneficial harm reduction.  If  addiction results in significant part from  randomly 
occurring mistakes, various interventions can serve social insurance objectives by ameliorating 
some of its worst consequences. For instance, subsidization of rehabilitation centers and treatment 
programs  (particularly  for  the  indigent)  can  moderate  the  financial  impact  of  addiction  and 
promote recovery.  Likewise, the free distribution of clean needles can moderate the incidence of 
diseases among heroin addicts. In some  cases, it may even be beneficial to make substances 
                                                 
19 In practice, addicts often suffer severe economic deprivation, turning to crime and prostitution for support.  High 
substance costs aggravate these consequences. 
20 As shown in Bernheim and Rangel [2004], this result depends on usage patterns.   48 
available to severe addicts at low cost.
21  As is usually the case, one must trade off the benefits 
from insurance against incentive effects: by moderating consequences, harm-reducing policies 
could in principle encourage casual use and experimentation. 
  5.  Policies  affecting  cues.    Since  environmental  cues  frequently  trigger  addictive 
behaviors,  public  policy  can  also  influence  use  by  changing  the  cues  that  people  normally 
encounter. One approach involves the elimination of problematic cues. For example, advertising 
and marketing restrictions of the type imposed on sellers of tobacco and alcohol suppresses one 
possible artificial trigger for compulsive use.  Since one person’s decision to smoke may trigger 
another,  confining  use  to  designated  areas  may  reduce  unintended  use.    A  second  approach 
involves the creation of counter-cues. For example, Brazil and Canada require every pack of 
cigarettes  to  display  a  prominent,  viscerally  charged  image  depicting  some  deleterious 
consequences of smoking, such as lung disease and neonatal morbidity. In principle, a sufficiently 
strong  counter-cue  could  trigger  thought  processes  that  induce  users  to  resist  cravings,  even 
though the same information is ineffective when offered in a less provocative format.  Policies 
that eliminate problematic cues or promote counter-cues are potentially beneficial because they 
combat compulsive use while imposing a minimal inconvenience and restrictions on deliberate 
rational users. 
  6. Facilitation of self-control.   The process-malfunction theory of addiction places a 
high  value  on  policies  that  provide  better  opportunities  for  self-regulation  without  making 
particular choices compulsory. This potentially helps those who are vulnerable to compulsive use, 
without encroaching on the freedoms of those who would deliberately choose to use.  Laws that 
limit the sale of a substance to particular times, places, and circumstances frequently provide 
limited opportunities along these lines (see e.g. Ornstein and Hanssens [1985], Norstrom and 
Skog  [2005],  and  Tigerstedt  and  Sutton  [2000]).    Well-designed  policies  could  in  principle 
accomplish this objective more effectively. For example, a number of states have enacted laws 
allowing  problem  gamblers  to  voluntarily  ban  themselves  from  casinos  (Yerak  [2001]). 
Alternatively, if a substance is available only by prescription, and if prescription orders are filled 
on  a  "next  day"  basis,  then  deliberate  forward-looking  planning  becomes  a  prerequisite  for 
availability.  Recovering  heroin  addicts  could  self-regulate  problematic  compulsive  use  by 
carefully choosing when, and when not, to file requests for refills.  
                                                 
21 For example, Swiss policy makes heroin available at low cost to severe addicts.   49 
  4.F. Modeling addiction with quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
One important line of work modifies Becker and Murphy’s model of “rational addiction” 
by  adding  quasi-hyperbolic  (β,δ)-discounting  (see  Gruber  and  Koszegi  [2001,  2004]  and 
O’Donoghue and Rabin [2000]).
22  In contrast to the theory of rational addiction, the consumer 
acts  as  if  he  attaches  disproportionate  importance  (1/β)  to  current  well-being  when  making 
decisions about current consumption.   
Gruber and Koszegi use this model to compute optimal cigarette taxes. When evaluating 
individual  welfare,  they  assume  that  true  preferences  correspond  to  standard  exponential 
discounting. Implicitly, they adopt the interpretation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting discussed in 
Section 2.D: true preferences are standard, but the decision-making process leads individuals to 
make present-biased mistakes, which the (β,δ)-model captures in reduced form.  
In principle, one could defend this interpretation with reference to the evidence described 
in Section 2.D.  Unfortunately, the model does not fit these facts in two important respects.  First, 
the evidence indicates that  mistakes are domain-specific.  In  contrast, the proclivity to make 
present-biased  mistakes  in  the  (β,δ)-model  cuts  across  all  domains.    Second,  the  evidence 
indicates that mistakes are triggered by intermittent environmental cues.  In contrast, the decision 
maker always suffers from present-bias in Gruber and Koszegi’s framework.  
One could, of course, formulate a variant of Gruber and Koszegi’s model with narrow-
domain, cue-triggered present-bias.  The resulting model would be a close cousin of the process-
malfunction  theory  of  addiction  discussed  in  the  previous  section.   However,  one  significant 
difference would remain.  In the β-δ framework with the proposed modifications, the decision 
maker would remain sophisticated, forward-looking, and responsive to economic incentives even 
when suffering from present-bias.  In contrast, the process-malfunction theory holds that mistakes 
result from simple impulses generated by a hard-wired process that encompasses a limited range 
of consequences. 
In some respects, the policy implications of this approach are similar to those discussed 
in the preceding section.  Informational policy alone is limited because it cannot address the 
causes of present-bias.  Supply disruption is potentially beneficial, as are policies that facilitate 
the exercise of self-control. 
In other respects, the policy implications described by Gruber and Koszegi differ sharply 
from those discussed in the preceding section.   Most notably, the β-δ framework provides  a 
rationale for “sin taxes” (see also O’Donoghue and Rabin [2005]).  When making decisions, the 
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 In an earlier related paper, Winston [1980] modeled addiction by assuming that lifetime preferences vary with states 
of nature.   50 
consumer always puts too little weight on future consequences, including those resulting from 
adjacent  complementarities.    The  government  can  address  these  “internalities”  (externalities 
imposed on future selves) by imposing a Pigouvian tax on current consumption.  Accordingly, the 
rate  of  taxation  for  addictive  substances  should  be  higher  than  that  justified  by  marginal 
externalities.  For example, according to Gruber and Koszegi’s simulations, the optimal tax on 
each pack of cigarettes is at least a dollar higher than would be justified by externalities alone. 
Why do the models of Bernheim-Rangel and Gruber-Koszegi lead to sharply differing 
conclusions concerning substance taxation?  The answer lies in two of the issues discussed above.  
First, Gruber and Koszegi assume that consumers always make present-biased mistakes, while 
Bernheim  and  Rangel  assume  that  mistakes  occur  only  in  the  presence  of  intermittent 
environmental cues.  Accordingly, social insurance can enhance the consumer’s well-being in 
Bernheim-Rangel, but not in Gruber-Koszegi.  In other words, Gruber and Koszegi’s assumptions 
eliminate  the  factor  that  argues  against  high  tax  burdens  in  Bernheim  and  Rangel’s  model.  
Second,  Gruber and  Koszegi assume that the decision maker remains sophisticated, forward-
looking, and responsive to economic incentives even while committing errors, whereas Bernheim 
and  Rangel  assume  that  errors  result  from  a  mechanical  and  largely  inflexible  process.  
Accordingly, taxation directly reduces decision errors in Gruber-Koszegi, but has a limited effect 
along these lines in Bernheim-Rangel.   
  4.G. Modeling addiction with temptation preferences 
Gul  and  Pesendorfer  [2005]  propose  a  model  of  addiction  based  on  the  temptation 
preferences  discussed  in  section  3.G.    Following  their  earlier  work  on  temptation  (Gul  and 
Pesendorfer  [2001]),  they  assume  that  the  consumer’s  preferences  are  defined  both  over 
consumption bundles and over the sets from which these bundles are chosen.  In each period of 
life, the consumer divides his resources between two goods, one of which is addictive, with the 
object of maximizing an intertemporal utility function.  This function is standard in all respects, 
except that it is modified to include, for each period, a penalty representing net temptation from 
the most tempting unchosen alternative in the choice set.  Even though the consumer applies the 
same lifetime preferences at every moment in time and makes no mistakes, precommitments are 
still  potentially  valuable  because  they  reduce  the  unpleasant  feelings  associated  with  the 
temptation to consume addictive substances. 
  Gul and Pesendorfer’s model invokes a number of important assumptions.  The following 
three deserve emphasis.  First, the level of temptation associated with an alternative depends only 
on the level of the addictive good, and not at all on the level of the non-addictive good.  Second,   51 
recent consumption of the addictive substance increases the weight given to temptation, but does 
not enter the “standard” portion of the utility function.  According to this assumption, as long as 
an individual is forced to abstain from the addictive substance, his experienced well-being is 
unrelated to his past consumption.  As a result, this assumption is in sharp conflict with evidence 
on cravings and withdrawal.  Third, the consumer only experiences temptation with respect to 
current choices.  For example, when deciding whether to enter rehabilitation for the next period, 
he is not tempted by the prospect of future drug use. 
  In the Gul-Pesendorfer model, private markets tend to work poorly relative to the first-
best.  Markets provide people with choices, and choices create costly temptation.   Unless it is 
possible to irrevocably lock in all choices in advance, a consumer is typically happier with the 
first-best consumption trajectory when someone else chooses it for him, than when he chooses it 
himself in “real time” (it is first-best in the first instance, but not in the second). 
  Even  though  the  laissez  faire  solution  is  inefficient,  the  optimal  rate  of  taxation  or 
subsidization  for  an  addictive  good  is  zero.    The  same  result  holds  in  standard  models  of 
commodity taxation (when the government has no revenue requirement), for essentially the same 
reasons.  However, we conjecture that this is a knife-edge case, driven by the first assumption 
mentioned above.  It would appear that if, contrary to the assumption, temptation depends, at least 
to some extent, on immediate rewards from the non-addictive good (in addition to consumption 
of the addictive substance), the optimal rate of sin taxation is strictly positive.
23 
  Other policy implications resemble those discussed in previous sections.  Informational 
policy alone is limited because it cannot address the causes of temptation.  Supply disruption is 
potentially beneficial because it removes tempting alternatives.  Policies that facilitate self-control 
can also enhance welfare by allowing consumers to eliminate alternatives that would otherwise 
prove tempting in the future. 
  4.H. Looking Ahead 
 
  The case of addiction exemplifies the potential for improving policy analysis through the 
integration of psychology, neuroscience, and economics.  Though progress is evident, much work 
remains.    We  close  this  section  with  a  brief  discussion  of  some  important  open  questions.
                                                 
23 Holding the consumption level for the addictive substance fixed, an increase in the rate of sin taxation reduces the 
consumption level of the non-addictive good, rendering the alternative less attractive.  Since the size of this effect is 
proportional to the quantity of the addictive substance, taxation presumably reduces the “temptation gap” between 
alternatives with low and high levels of addictive consumption.   Furthermore, this is a first-order effect.  Accordingly, 
one suspects, intuitively, that a small positive tax is welfare-enhancing.  We have not yet attempted to verify this 
conjecture formally.  
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  Estimation and testing of competing behavioral models.  Almost all of the existing 
empirical work on addictive behavior is either atheoretical (i.e., it documents factual patterns) or 
based on the framework of rational addiction.  So far, research on behavioral alternatives has 
been  almost  exclusively  theoretical.    It  is  important  to  explore  the  feasibility  of  estimating 
parsimonious structural versions of the various competing behavioral models, using both choice 
data  and  a  combination  of  choice  and  non-choice  data.    Insights  from  ongoing  research  in 
neuroscience should be exploited to develop procedures for acquiring and using new types of 
pertinent  non-choice  data  (e.g.,  on  physical  states).    Future  research  should  compare  the 
performance of the models in explaining observed behavior, and examine testable implications 
that  distinguish  between  them.    Empirical  research  can  potentially  shed  light  on  the  relative 
importance of the various forces at work in these models. 
  Imperfect foresight. Most of the economic literature on addiction assumes that people 
perfectly understand the benefits and costs of substance use, including its effects on future tastes 
and  decision-making  processes.    The  evidence  suggests  that  this  extreme  assumption  is 
unrealistic. For example, in a study of high-school seniors who smoked cigarettes, 56% predicted 
that they would not be smoking in 5 years, but in fact only 31% were able to quit (USDHH 
[1994]). 
  Under the assumption that decision makers are completely or partially naïve, models with 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting incorporate imperfect self-understanding.  While this represents a 
step in the right direction, further work is clearly needed.  Models of naïve behavior should draw 
on new and existing empirical research concerning the nature of unsophisticated decision making.  
They should allow for the possibility that people lack perfect foresight not only with respect to 
their own future tastes and choices, but also with respect to other consequences, such as health 
effects (e.g., as in Hung [2000]).  They should also introduce the possibility that people learn 
about their self-control problems with experience. 
  The literature on “projection bias” (e.g., Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin [2003]) 
illustrates  the  potential  to  discover  important  regularities  concerning  the  structure  of  naïve 
decision making through empirical research.  This phrase refers to the tendency for people to 
assume that their future likes and dislikes will be more similar to their current likes and dislikes 
than is actually the case.
24  Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin [2003] briefly and informally 
discuss several provocative implications for addiction.  Victims of projection bias are more likely 
                                                 
24 Projection bias does not imply that lifetime preferences vary from one point in time to another. On the contrary, an 
otherwise standard consumer suffering from projection bias wants future tastes to govern future choices.  However, he 
makes decisions based on biased forecasts of future tastes.   53 
to become addicted against their interests because they underestimate both the effects of habit 
formation and the degree to which current consumption has negative consequences for future 
health.    Once  addicted,  they  are  more  likely  to  try  to  quit  when  they  are  not  experiencing 
cravings, because they underestimate future cravings.  Conditional on attempting to quit, they are 
also more likely to “fall off the wagon” because, upon experiencing cravings, they overestimate 
the difficulty of continued abstention in the future. 
  Differences across substances and populations. It is important to emphasize that there 
is no single combination of policies that is ideal for all addictive substances. For example, while 
alcohol  and  crack  cocaine  are  both  addictive,  public  policy  should  (and  does)  treat  them 
differently. A number of factors affect the relative desirability of the various policy alternatives, 
including  (but  not  limited  to)  the  typical  individual’s  susceptibility  to  addiction,  the 
responsiveness  of  compulsive  and  deliberative  use  to  prices  and  other  incentives,  and  the 
magnitude of the externalities imposed on third parties. It is also important to stress that the ideal 
policy regime for any particular substance may evolve over time as our ability to treat, control, 
and/or predict addiction develops.  Ideally, economists should attempt to estimate parametric 
behavioral models for a wide range of substances and populations, and to use these estimates as a 
basis for determining the best policy for each substance.  
   
5. Public Goods 
 
In  this  section,  we  review  the  contributions  of  behavioral  public  economics  to  our 
understanding  of  public  goods.    As  in  previous  sections,  we  identify  the  key  policy  issues, 
summarize the standard approach, and discuss empirical evidence that calls this approach into 
question.  We then review the leading behavioral alternative and discuss its implications. 
 
5.A. The policy problem 
A large number and wide variety of public policy issues –from the environment to school 
finance, and from the war on poverty to the financing of basic research – involve the provision of 
public  goods.    Funding  for  these  goods  flows  from  both  public  and  private  sources.  At  the 
community level, philanthropic activities in the U.S. address a large class of socially valuable 
activities, from assisting the poor to financing cultural events. Andreoni [2004] reports that, for 
the U.S., contributions to the philanthropic sector totaled 240.3 billion dollars in 2003; moreover, 
in  1997,  roughly  45,000  charitable,  religious,  and  other  non-for-profit  organizations  were   54 
registered with the government.
25  Voluntarily provided public goods also play important roles in 
smaller groups, such as families. 
In each of these domains, public goods give rise to a common problem: how can the 
group best overcome free riding and provide funding at an appropriate level? Should the group 
provide its members with incentives to contribute (e.g., tax breaks)?  Should it require mandatory 
contributions (e.g,, through taxes)?  Is it best to have a hybrid system that draws on both public 
and private contributions? 
  To answer these questions, economists require a theory of public goods that explains 
observed patterns of voluntary giving.  The theory must explain why people give, how they select 
the causes to which they contribute, and how their contributions respond to economic variables, 
government policies, and the behavior of others.  It should also account for the existence of 
philanthropic  organizations,  and  explain  how  the  activities  of  these  entities  respond  to 
government policy. 
 
5.B. The neoclassical perspective on public goods 
The  standard  model  of  public  goods  assumes  that  each  member  of  a  group  of  N 
individuals has true preferences over consumption of private goods (denoted x
i) and public goods 
(denoted G).  These preferences are represented by a utility function U
i(x
i,G). For expositional 
simplicity, we focus here on a simple model with only one private good and one public good, 
where one unit of the private good is required to produce each unit of the public good, and where 
each individual i is endowed with w
i units of the private good. All of the results described below 
generalize to more complicated settings.  Each individual contributes an amount g
i to the public 
good.  In  addition, individual i pays a lump-sum tax, T
i, and the government contributes all 
revenues  to  the  public  good.    Consequently,  G  =  (g
1  +  T
1)  +  …  +  (g
N  +  T
N).    Individuals 
simultaneously  select  their  contributions  after  learning  the  values  of  the  lump-sum  taxes.  
Behavior is governed by Nash equilibrium.  Let g
i* denote the equilibrium level of contributions, 
and G* = g
1*+ … + g
N*  denote the equilibrium level of public goods. 
It is useful to highlight the key assumptions built into this framework. First, individuals 
only care about their consumption of private and public goods. They do not benefit directly from 
making  contributions,  nor  do  they  care  about  others’  consumption  or  well-being.  Second, 
individuals do not care about the process through which allocations are determined. For example, 
they  are  indifferent  between  public  and  private  provision  as  long  as  the  level  of  private 
                                                 
25 The sources of these funds are as follows: 76.3% came from individuals, 11.2% came from foundations, 7.5% from 
bequests, and the remaining 5.1% was given by corporations.   55 
consumption and public good provision is the same in both instances.  Notice also that, in this 
simple model, there is no obvious role for charitable fundraising.  For example, since people are 
fully informed about the public good, there is no reason for charities to disseminate information. 
This model has featured prominently in several important strands of the literature. These 
include work on optimal tax and regulatory policy in the presence of externalities, the design of 
efficient mechanisms for public goods problems , and political economy models of public goods 
provision.  From a positive perspective, the model has a number of sharp, testable implications, 
including  the  following  (see  Bergstrom,  Blume,  and  Varian  [1986]  and  Andreoni  [1988]  for 
details): 
1.Extreme income elasticities. If individuals have identical preferences, there exists an 
endowment level w
* such that (a) only those with an endowment larger than  w




* otherwise. The result extends to the case of heterogeneous tastes as long as each 
taste-type is represented across the income distribution.  It follows that the marginal propensity to 
contribute  to  the  public  good  is  exactly  unity  (measured  in  the  cross-section,  controlling  for 
individual characteristics) for those with sufficiently high resources,
26 and exactly zero for the 
rest of the population. It also follows that all contributors (of the same type) consume the same 
amount of private goods.   
2. Only the wealthy contribute.  In large groups only the very upper tail of the income 
distribution  contributes  to the  public  good.  Furthermore,  as  the  population  grows  (fixing  the 
distribution of wealth), contributors account for a smaller fraction of the population.  As a result, 
the  effect  of  population  size  on  total  contributions  converges  to  zero  for  sufficiently  large 
populations.   Unless the group is small, the level of public goods depends only on the wealth of 
the very rich: changes in wealth for the rest of the population have no impact on total provision. 
3. Neutrality of public provision.   Public provision of public goods financed through 
lump-sum  taxation  is  neutral  as  long  as  no individual  pays  a  lump-sum  tax  greater  than  the 
contribution  he  would  make  in  the  absence  of  government  intervention.  In  this  case  public 
contributions fully crowd out of private contributions. While the conditions required for neutrality 
seem  stark,  the  result  generalizes  to  other  environments.  For  example,  Bernheim  [1986]  and 
Andreoni [1988] have shown that the total level of the public goods is invariant, or approximately 
invariant, with respect to public provision financed by distortionary taxes, and with respect to 
subsidized giving. These results build on earlier work by Warr [1982] and Roberts [1984]. 
                                                 
26 In response to an exogenous increase in resources (as opposed to cross-sectional variation), a contributor will 
increase private consumption.  However, if the number of contributors is large, the recipeint’s marginal propensity to 
consume the private good is approximately zero.   56 
4.Contributions from external sources (almost) fully crowd out internal funding. In a 
large economy, exogenous contributions to the public good (made by someone outside the group, 
say a higher level of government) have a negligible impact on the  level of provision.  In other 
words, external funding almost fully crowds out of private contributions. It follows, for example, 
that contributions from a higher level of government to a local charity cannot measurably increase 
total funding, assuming the number of contributors is reasonably large. 
5. Neutrality of redistribution.  Redistributing wealth among contributors has no effect 
on the total level of contributions. In contrast, redistributing wealth from the group of contributors 
to the group of non-contributors decreases the total level of the public good. 
These results are valuable because they provide stark and robust testable implications of 
the standard model. How well do they match the data? 
  
5.C. Some problematic observations 
One of the most influential empirical tests of the standard model is Kingma [1989].  In 
contrast  to  the  bulk  of  the  literature  that  preceded  it,  this  paper  studies  contributions  to  a 
particular  public  good  –  the  operation  of  public  radio  stations  –  rather  than  aggregate 
contributions.  The narrow focus is desirable because, when analyzing aggregates, it is difficult to 
harmonize the scope of data pertaining to public and private contributions.  Moreover, a high rate 
of giving in the aggregate may mask low rates of giving to individual causes.  The paper uses a 
unique cross-sectional dataset on the funding sources and member contributions to 66 public 
radio stations across the U.S. serving non-overlapping markets. It has two main findings. First, 
about half of the subjects in the sample (who  were  recruited for a study of listening habits) 
contribute  positive  amounts.  The  average  contribution  given  was  $45.  Contributors  were 
wealthier and more educated on average, but not by a significant amount. This finding stands in 
sharp contrast to implications 1 and 2 from the previous section. Second, a $10,000 increase in 
“exogenous” public contributions to the station (that is, contributions financed by federal taxes 
rather than taxes on local members) reduces private contributions by $1,350 for a typical station 
with 9,000 members. This contradicts implication 4.  
Kingma’s first finding is consistent with patterns observed in the aggregate data. For 
example, Andreoni [2004] reports that, in 1995, 68.5% of all households gave to charity, and the 
average  gift  amount  was  $1081.  Even  relatively  poor  households  gave  almost  5%  of  their 
incomes, on average, to charity; as a fraction of income, households in upper-income brackets 
actually gave less.     57 
Kingma’s second finding is also roughly consistent with other studies based on aggregate 
data. For example, Abrams and Schmitz [1978a,b] and Clotfelter [1985] find that public transfers 
to the ‘non-for-profit’ sector crowd out private giving at the rate of 5 to 28 cents on the dollar.  
  The first four implications listed in the previous section have also been tested in the 
laboratory.  Isaac  and  Walker  [1988]  study  the  effect  of  group  size  in  linear  public  good 
experiments.  Subjects  play  repeatedly  with  either  3  or  9  other  participants.  Each  round  they 
receive an endowment of tokens and decide how many tokens to contribute to the public good. 
Tokens are valuable because they are exchangeable for cash at the end of the experiment. Each 
token contributed to the public good yields either 0.3 or 0.7 tokens for everyone in the group, 
including the contributor. Since each token contributed entails a net loss, the standard model 
predicts that it is a dominant strategy for every subject to contribute nothing. As in many other 
experiments in this literature, subjects initially contribute roughly 50% of tokens on average, but 
this figure falls as the experiment is repeated.  Neither average individual contributions nor the 
fraction  of  subjects  contributing  a  positive  amount  decline  with  group  size.    These  findings 
contradict implication 2. 
Andreoni [1993] studies a variant of the previous experiment in which payoffs vary non-
linearly with the number of tokens.  This generates  a Nash equilibrium with strictly positive 
contributions.  He tests the neutrality of public provision (implication 3) by comparing behavior 
in two closely related treatments.  In each case, subjects choose how many tokens to contribute 
and are given a 2-dimensional table that describes how their payoffs change as a function of their 
contribution  and  the  aggregate  contributions  of  others.  In  one  treatment,  they  are,  in  effect, 
required  to  contribute  at  least  two  tokens;  in  the  other  treatment,  they  are  not  required  to 
contribute  anything.
27    Andreoni’s  results  imply  that  public  contributions  crowd  out  private 
contributions at the rate of 71 cents on the dollar.  While this rate of crowding-out is high in 
comparison with other estimates in the literature, it is still inconsistent with implication 3. 
These papers, together with a growing body of related evidence (see Ledyard [1995] and 
Camerer [2003] for reviews), have lead many economists to reject the standard model, and to 
search for superior alternatives.  The rest of this section reviews the state of the literature and 
summarizes its implications for public economics. 
 
5.D. Models involving “warm glow” 
                                                 
27 Given the importance of framing effects in social exchange experiments, it is noteworthy that the minimum 
contribution level is imposed by restating the payoffs associated with a given contribution profile, rather than by 
retaining the same payoff mapping and restricting choices.    58 
To account for the evidence described in the preceding section, Andreoni [1989,1990] 
proposed a “warm-glow” model of public good contributions, which builds on ideas in earlier 
papers by Blinder [1974], Becker [1974], Cornes and Sandler [1984] and Steinberg [1987]. His 
approach entails a straightforward modification of the standard model: individuals are assumed to 
behave as if they maximize a utility function of the form U
i(x
i, g
i, G) instead of U
i(x
i,G). In this 
formulation, each individual cares directly about the amount he contributes to the public good, in 
addition to his consumption of the private and public goods. 
This modification overturns each of the implications discussed in the preceding section, 
and  leads  to  more  sensible  policy  implications.  For  example,  as  the  size  of  the  population 
increases,  choosing  a  contribution  level  becomes  more  and  more  like  picking  the  level  of 
consumption for any conventional good.  In the limit, the contributor simply weighs the relative 
merits of spending money on two different private goods, x
i and g
i; the effect on his well-being 
through G becomes negligible  Accordingly, the model can produce sensible income elasticities 
and high rates of charitable giving throughout the income distribution.  The level of the public 
good  is  responsive  to  changes  in  the  income  distribution,  public  provision  increases  funding 
levels whether financed by taxes on group members or by external sources, and redistributions 
among contributors are non-neutral.  In fact, in the warm-glow model, the optimal tax treatment 
of charitable contributions qualitatively resembles the U.S. tax code (Diamond [2005]).  In short, 
the implications of the warm-glow model are more consistent than the standard framework both 
with the empirical findings described in the previous section, and with the perspective of policy 
makers.   
In  contrast  to  some  of  the  work  on  addiction  or  saving  summarized  in  the  last  two 
sections,  the  literature  on  warm-glow  giving  has  had  little  to  say  about  the  mechanisms 
responsible  for  generating  departures  from  the  standard  framework.  While  it  is  plainly 
appropriate to think of the model as a reduced form representation of a more complex underlying 
process, the nature of this process is largely unexplained.  
A partial list of possible warm-glow mechanisms includes the following. First, people 
may experience positive emotions (e.g., pride) when they conform to or exceed certain standards 
of “virtuous” behavior, or negative emotions (e.g., guilt) when they fall short of these standards.  
Second, they may be concerned about the inferences that others draw from their actions (for 
example, whether they are generous or public-spirited), and this may increase their willingness to 
contribute (Harbaugh [1998], Shang and Croson [2005]). Third, upon forming a group, people 
may contribute to establish a norm of positive reciprocity, thereby promoting future cooperation. 
Fourth, when it is possible for group members to inflict harm on each other, giving may rise in   59 
response to implicit or explicit threats (negative reciprocity) that become credible as a result of 
emotional responses, such as anger (see Fehr and Gachter [2000,2002], Ferhr and Fischbacher 
[2003,2004], Sefton et. al. [2002] and Masclet et. al. [2003]).  
One  of  the  main  themes  of  this  paper  is  that  a  good  understanding  of  pertinent 
psychological and neural processes is often helpful in formulating reduced form models that can 
faithfully reproduce observed patterns and reliably predict behavior out of sample, as well as in 
justifying specific normative criteria.  Unfortunately, in the context of warm glow giving and 
public goods, these processes are not yet well understood.  The warm glow model remains a 
“black box,” and one can interpret it as a reduced form for a variety of mechanisms with starkly 
differing welfare implications.  Diamond [2005] argues that, given the limited state of knowledge 
concerning processes, measures of social welfare should exclude the apparent benefits from the 
warm glow.  He advocates using the warm-glow model for positive purposes (that is, to describe 
behavior), but favors the standard model for evaluating welfare.  Andreoni [2004] expresses a 
similar view, and in addition argues that economists are unlikely to shed much light on the nature 
of the true preferences that give rise to warm-glow behavior.  While we are more sanguine about 
the prospects for meaningful progress, we agree that economists do not yet understand warm-
glow mechanisms sufficiently well to resolve important questions about positive and normative 
analysis. 
One concern is that apparent warm glow behavior may sometimes reflect a divergence 
between choices and true preferences.  In some instances, people may give because they derive 
pleasure from the act.  For example, giving to a worthy cause may make them feel proud to have 
taken  constructive  action,  or  it  may  assuage  their  guilt.    In  such  cases,  revealed  preference 
provides a reasonable basis for welfare evaluation (subject to the further qualifications discussed 
below).  However, in other situations, exposure to an emotionally manipulative message may 
precipitate giving by triggering a short-lived emotional reaction such as shame, and people may 
experience remorse shortly thereafter (see Loewenstein [1996] and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 
[2004] for other interesting examples of this type of phenomena).  Different implications for 
welfare follow depending on whether the individual, when in a normal state of mind, wishes to 
limit  his  ability  to  give  upon  encountering  an  emotional  trigger.    If  behavior  is  dynamically 
consistent, it may be appropriate to adopt a state-contingent version of the warm-glow model for 
both positive and normative analysis.  However, if behavior is dynamically inconsistent, it may 
be appropriate to discount the “revealed” impact of giving on transient perceptions of well-being 
(e.g., for the reasons discussed at the end of Section 2.C).     60 
  A  second  concern  is  that  warm  glow  effects  appear  to  be  context-dependent.  
Experiments have shown that the amount of giving depends on framing, the identity of the group, 
the emotional state of the subjects, and the history of play.  Here we mention two examples. First, 
Andreoni [1995] finds that a change in the phrasing of instructions can have a sizable effect on 
contributions, even when strategy sets and payoffs are unchanged.  Second, Isaac and Walker 
[1988] (and dozens of subsequent studies) find that the level of contributions decreases  with 
repetition  in  both  small  and  large  groups.
28  Furthermore,  the  rate  of  decline  depends  on  the 
behavior of others: subjects are more likely to stop acting cooperatively if others behave selfishly 
(see Ledyard [1986] and Camerer [2003] for surveys of the literature). 
This concern is relevant for policy analysis.  The appropriate reduced-form representation 
of warm-glow giving may vary from one set of policies and institutions to another.  The practice 
of forecasting the behavioral effects of a policy change based on fixed warm-glow parameters is 
therefore vulnerable to the Lucas critique.  For example, if people experience less pride when 
making contributions in the presence of economic incentives, subsidization of contributions will 
stimulate  less  giving  than  anticipated,  and  could  even  reduce  it.    Alternatively,  people  may 
become less resistant to taxation if they are regularly supplied with more concrete and visual 
evidence of the benefits derived from public expenditures.  Public relation campaigns that show 
“your tax dollars at work” are, in effect, intended to foster a warm glow.   
  One could, of course, modify the warm-glow model to account for context-dependence 
by linking the taste for giving to features of the environment in just the right way. However, this 
solution is conceptually unsatisfactory.  One cannot usefully explain a phenomenon by selecting 
ad hoc preferences that rationalize choices ex post (Stigler and Becker [1977]).  If every context 
is  potentially  associated  with  a  different  mode  of  behavior,  out-of-sample  prediction  is 
impossible.  To anticipate the positive effects of policy changes, one therefore needs a broad 
theory that accounts for the relevance of context.  This requires us to open the black box. 
Since  the  warm-glow  mechanism  may  differ  from  one  context  to  another,  a  deeper 
understanding  of  context-dependence  is  also  essential  for  welfare  analysis.    To  illustrate  the 
problem, consider the following hypothetical example.  How should we evaluate a policy that 
replaces private contributions to a public good with tax-financed contributions, without changing 
either the total amount obtained from any individual or the overall level of funding?  Are people 
worse off because they lose the beneficial warm glow associated with giving?  Are they better off 
                                                 
28
Palfrey and Prisbey [1997] argue that the implied decline in the warm-glow taste parameter may in part reflect falling 
rates of decision errors.  To our knowledge, there is no evidence that distinguishes between the hypothesis that tastes 
evolve with repetition and the possibility that error rates decline.  However, errors do not appear to explain many other 
findings in this literature.   61 
because  public  funding  relieves  them  of  guilt?    Or  are  they  equally  well  off  because  they 
experience the same warm glow from giving voluntarily and from paying their taxes?  While it 
may be difficult to resolve this issue, we are optimistic about the prospects for progress through 
further  research  involving  a  combination  of  psychology,  neuroscience,  and  experimental 
economics. 
Despite these concerns, the theoretical and empirical literatures concerning warm-glow 
giving have already contributed significantly to our understanding of public goods, and have 
changed the way many public economists think about related policies.  We can now say with 
some confidence that people act as if they care about the levels of their own contributions.  We 
know  that  the  intensity  of  this  effect  depends  on  context.    While  we  lack  a  good  theory  of 
context-dependence, we have a good set of empirical regularities from which to build.  We have 
good reason to believe that people feel differently about public and private contributions.  We 
have both direct and indirect evidence that public contributions crowd out private contributions at 
a  rate  significantly  less  than  dollar-for-dollar.    Accordingly,  even  low  levels  of  public 
contributions can significantly raise total funding.  There is strong evidence that people give more 
when  institutions  activate  psychological  mechanisms,  such  as  concerns  about  reciprocity  and 
fairness, that play central roles in giving.  From a policy perspective, this suggests that relatively 
inexpensive strategies involving advertising and the promotion of community leadership may 
deserve greater emphasis. 
 
5.E. Looking Ahead 
Given the crucial role that public goods and externalities play in many important policy 
problems, one of the  main  challenges  ahead  for public economics is to build and test better 
models  of  public  goods,  and  to  apply  them  to  basic  questions  in  public  finance,  political 
economy, and mechanism design. We are still far from a satisfactory model of public goods that 
can become a new workhorse for economic applications across the board. However, based on the 
rapidly growing body of evidence concerning the psychological and neural processes at work, 
including research on the neural basis of empathy, punishment, and cooperation (see DeQuervain 
et. al.  [2004],  McCabe  et. al. [2001], Singer  et. al.  [2004], and  Rilling [2002,2004]),  we  are 
optimistic that such a framework is on the horizon. Given the number of likely forces at work – 
reciprocity, social norms, social emotions, social signaling, and so forth – it seems likely that a 
relatively complex and multifaceted approach is needed.  Yet it is also likely that the discovery of 
new  organizing  principles  will  permit  useful  simplifications  that  render  the  problem  more 
tractable.    62 
  In  focusing  here  on  individual  behavior,  we  have  largely  neglected  the  role  of 
philanthropic  organizations.  As  Andreoni  [2004]  convincingly  argues,  it  is  also  essential  to 
understand the behavior of the philanthropic sector.  A growing body of evidence shows that 
charities significantly stimulate giving, and that their activities respond both to government policy 
and to the behavior of other not-for-profit institutions.  For example, Andreoni and Payne [2003] 
show  that  government  grants  to  charities  reduce  fund-raising  activities;  Andreoni  and  Petrie 
[2004]  document  the  role  of  charities  in  disseminating  information;  and  Harbaugh  [1998] 
provides  evidence  that  charities  exploit  social  signaling  in  their  fundraising  campaigns.    For 
reviews of the economics of philanthropy, see Andreoni [2004] and Rose-Ackerman [1996]. 
 
6. The Road Ahead  
   
  In  our  view,  Behavioral  Public  Economics  has  enormous  potential,  and  has  already 
demonstrated its value by making important contributions to critical policy discussions.  We have 
emphasized  that  the  behavioral  perspective  does  not  preclude  coherent  normative  analysis.  
Indeed, in many cases, it is possible to modify and extend the tools of empirical welfare analysis 
without abandoning familiar methodological principles.  We have also reviewed recent behavioral 
work concerning policies affecting saving, addiction, and public goods.  Each of these literatures 
offers novel and important insights, as well as the potential for groundbreaking innovation.  
  The goal of this final section is to briefly highlight some critical directions for future 
research. 
  Better  models.    While  the  current  generation  of  behavioral  models  improves  the 
explanatory power of economic theory, many behavioral patterns remain unexplained.  Among 
other things, recent research has deemphasized considerations for which satisfactory and tractable 
formal models are not yet available, such as framing effects, the adoption of rules-of-thumb, and 
other  responses  to  environmental  complexity.    To  study  the  policy  implications  of  these 
phenomena, better models are required.  For example, we need theories that explain how people 
adopt rules of thumb, and how they adapt these rules to new environments. 
  New types and sources of data.  With sufficiently restrictive structural assumptions, it is 
possible to estimate positive and normative behavioral models using data only on choices.  The 
use  of  non-choice  data  would  potentially  allow  economists  to  estimate  these  models  more 
reliably, and to formulate more discriminating and robust tests of competing alternatives. 
   Future research should examine the possibility of measuring preferences directly, instead 
of inferring them from choices.  Self-reporting is a natural source of information about tastes.  In   63 
practice, there are several problems with self-reported preferences. First, when choices are not 
involved,  questions  about  preferences  are  inherently  hypothetical.    There  is  some  reason  to 
believe that people do not give reliable answers to hypothetical questions (see, e.g., List [2001] 
and the references therein).  For example, unless there is something at stake, they may not take 
these questions seriously.  Second, true preferences may conflict with social and moral norms, 
leading  subjects  to  either  rationalize  or  report  false  preferences.    Third,  people  may  make 
mistakes  in  assessing  their  own  preferences.    For  example,  a  sizable  body  of  literature  has 
documented systematic errors in affective forecasting (see Loewenstein and Schkade [1999] for a 
review).    Fourth,  context  may  affect  an  individual’s  ability  to  cognitively  access  his  true 
preferences. 
  Despite considerable evidence that self-reporting is susceptible to these problems (see 
Schwartz and Strack [1999] for a review), there is cause for optimism.  For the most part, the 
object  of  this  body  of  work  has  been  to  identify  experimental  manipulations  that  lead  to 
nonsensical self-reports.  While this demonstrates that there are important pitfalls associated with 
the direct elicitation of preferences, it does not prove that this approach is worthless.  As far as we 
know, there has been no systematic attempt to design elicitation protocols that are stable and 
resistant to manipulation.  
  Many  other  types  of  data  merit  consideration.    Even  without  eliciting  complete 
preferences,  one  can  potentially  learn  whether  an  individual  regards  a  particular  choice  as  a 
mistake, whether his choices correspond to his intentions, or whether he systematically fails to 
follow through on plans (see, e.g., Choi et. al. [2004] and Bernheim [1995]).  One can also elicit 
information  about  expectations  and  make  comparisons  with  realizations  (see,  e.g.,  Bernheim 
[1988,  1989],  Hurd  and  McGarry  [2002],  Loewenstein,  O’Donoghue,  and  Rabin  [2003]).  
Obviously,  information  along  these  lines  raises  many  of  the  same  concerns  as  self-reported 
preferences.    Finally,  economists  have  only  just  started  to  tap  data  on  physical  states,  brain 
activity, and the like.  While the value of neuroeconomic data remains largely unproven, the 
potential payoffs are high, and the possibilities are worth exploring. 
  Difficult  issues  in  welfare  economics.    The  nascent  field  of  “Behavioral  Welfare 
Economics” is far from settled.  Many thorny issues remain.  The following hypothetical problem 
illustrates one challenging issue.  An individual is presented with a choice between two options, A 
and B.   He is indifferent between them.  However, his preferences change as a result of his 
choice.  If he chooses A, he prefers B (call this the “A self”).  If he chooses B, he prefers A (call 
this the “B  self”).  Suppose he chooses A.  Since only the initial self and the A self actually exist, 
it seems natural to place no weight on the preferences of the B self.  But if we place any weight   64 
on the A self, B is the welfare optimum.  Of course, if we enforce this choice through public 
policy, the A self vanishes and the B self materializes, in which case A is the welfare optimum.  Is 
there a coherent way to resolve this ambiguity?  See Bernheim and Rangel [2005a] for a more 
systematic treatment of welfare economics in behavioral settings.   
  Non-standard  policies.  In  the  standard  model,  public  policy  affects  behavior  only 
through its effect on information and budget constraints. A growing body of literature, partially 
reviewed in the previous three sections, suggests that policy can also have powerful effects on 
behavior through other channels.  For example, it can provide or suppress cues, and it can alter 
the way decision problems are framed.  If economists can develop reliable formal models of these 
effects, it should be possible to study the optimal design of unconventional economic policies 
(e.g., restrictions on advertising, warning labels, and clever manipulations of framing effects as in 
Thaler  and  Shefrin’s  [2004]  Saving  for  Tomorrow  Savings  Plan
TM)  with  the  same  rigor  as 
traditional tax and expenditure policy. 
  New applications. The interesting collection of papers in this volume show that, as time 
passes, economists are applying behavioral economics to increasingly wide range of economic 
problems.  No doubt this trend will continue within the field of Public Economics.  Many of the 
tools described in this paper should prove useful in understanding issues pertaining to poverty, 
crime, corruption, and other important topics. 
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